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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Background
In 1975, President Gerald Ford signed into law,
Public Law 94-142, the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act

(EAHC~),

sometimes referred to as the Education

of the Handicapped Act (EHA) and changed by act of Congress
to the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA) as of
October 30, 1990.

When Ford approved this law, he was

enacting a descendent of a long line of legislative
amendments which had evolved to guarantee handicapped
children the right to a free and appropriate public
education (FAPE).

The EAHCA is easier understood, then, as

the "Bill of Educational Rights" for the handicapped.
Schimmel (1983) concluded, the question is no longer
whether handicapped children have a right to an education,
but rather, how their right to an "appropriate education" is
to be defined (5).
The implementation of this law has subsequently led
to a myriad of state laws, court cases, judicial rulings,
educational analyses, and major changes in the public
schools of the United States, having special implications
for school administrators who have been charged to provide
1
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free and appropriate educations for the handicapped students
they serve.
Public school administrators of today face an everincreasing number of legal issues at the school site.

The

complexities of the EAHCA and its stipulated special
education and related service requirements have become a
dominant source of rapidly expanding litigation, which tends
to divert already scarce financial resources from
educational programs to legal expenses.

It is important

that school leaders know this law, communicate its intent,
implement its provisions, and be effective in doing so in
order to provide the most appropriate education to the
handicapped and to avoid costly litigation, which in many
instances, has led to monetary damages, attorneys' fees, and
even loss of federal funding.
The federal and California statutes which establish
the educational rights of handicapped students, combined
with current and sometimes conflicting court decisions,
comprise a voluminous, complex, and difficult-to-understand
body of law.

Schimmel (1983) pointed out that

since a specific definition of what constitutes a free
appropriate public education is not included in the
EAHCA, it has been left up to the courts to decide on a
definition pertinent to each case. The definitions from
cases have not been uniform (5).
The difficult and human issues involved in the
education of the handicapped are further complicated by two
characteristics.

First, the legal principles involved with
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education for the handicapped are relatively new.

Most of

this body of law has been established since 1975.

Second,

this body of law changes rapidly.

In a 1981 study, the

National Center for State Courts estimated that litigation
involving the rights of handicapped students comprised 35 to
40 percent of all civil cases involving the rights of
students filed since 1976 (Zirkel 1989, 20-21).
Although major uncertainties continue to surround
many aspects of legal compliance, test cases are fewer now
than when the EABCA was first implemented.
Not many organizations can sustain the expense of
protracted court proceedings, and legal advocates are
reluctant to initiate major class action suits in a
political climate they perceive as increasingly hostile
to broad interpretations of the law (Singer and Butler
1987, 144).
Even though their study is not to be perceived as a
national study, Singer and Butler (1987, 144) suggested that
in the five communities they studied, legal and
administrative actions to enforce compliance have waned
dramatically. According to Singer and Butler, a predictable
advocacy cycle has been enacted: an initial flurry of
activity, followed by institutionalization of the law, and
then after ten years, the tendency among many groups to turn
to other issues and priorities.

In the implementation of

the EABCA, there have been and continue to be issues and/or
grievances which, even after being processed through
administrative hearings that have well established
precedence, fail to be resolved except through judicial rulings.

4

Statement of the Problem
Two common problems in the implementation of the
EAHCA that have failed to be resolved except by the courts
deal with disputes on appropriate special education
placements, i.e., public versus private school and
residential versus day school, and disputes on "medical
service" limitations in the EAHCA related services
definitions.

Further, related to both issues, a major

problem has arisen which is linked to the divergence of
opinions of school administrators who must make
educational/fiscal decisions under the EAHCA while
attempting to morally and ethically comply with the
philosophical and legal mandates of the EAHCA.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to clarify issues
dealing specifically with implementing the stipulations of
the EAHCA regarding appropriate special education placement
and special education related services, in particular
exempted medical services, especially in light of the
stringent fiscal status in most public schools today.

This

study examines issues of operational special education and
indirect costs faced by educational decision makers as they
are confronted with fiscal, education, and legal variables
in their attempts to comply with the EAHCA.

The hidden

costs are predominately those related to litigation.
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This study provides an historical perspective on how
handicapped education was implemented prior to 1975 and then
subsequent to passage of P.L. 94-142 (the EAHCA) in 1975.
The study focuses on definitions stipulated in federal
statutes, especially those regarding placement and medical
related services.

Current California statutes and

administrative regulations are reviewed, along with federal
and state case law dealing with judicial findings and
holdings regarding compliance with EAHCA placement and
related service requirements.
The total study, including the history of education
for the handicapped, current operating procedures in
California, and the most recent judicial findings and
holdings, serves as the content basis for a staff
development program in the Clovis Unified School District
(hereafter referred to as Clovis Unified) for site
principals, teachers, and special education managers.
Methodology
A legal case study of a recent Clovis Unified
litigation, which focused on appropriate special education
placement and related services, is the focal point for an
examination of procedural steps required by the EAHCA of
parents and school district officials in order to be in
compliance with not only the EAHCA, but also the growing
body of federal and state judicial holdings with regard to
education for the handicapped.

First, the case cited
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demonstrates the due process procedures existent for the
protection of handicapped students, their parents, and the
educational institutions responsible for providing a FAPE.
Second, the case illustrates the administrative hearings and
judicial appeals available to the handicapped students and
the responsible school district.

Third, the case cited

illustrates the evolving nature of judicial interpretations
in the implementation of the EAHCA and the effects of such

rulings on educational decision makers.
Case Study: Michelle S.
The methodology used in this study was the
examination of a legal case recently litigated in the

u.s.

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: Clovis Unified
School District--Appellant v. California Office of
Administrative Hearings, Michelle

s.,

Real Party in

Interest--Appellee (1990, 4811-17).
The nature of the case presents the question of
whether schools must pay for the private psychiatric
hospitalization of a handicapped child under the "related
services" definitions of P.L. 94-142.

In this case the

u.s.

District Court for the Eastern District of California ruled
that Clovis Unified must pay for medical costs, the
hospitalization of Michelle.

Clovis Unified appealed that

decision on the grounds that the district court ignored
pertinent state special education policies, procedures, and
laws that the state developed to ensure a free and
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appropriate education to all handicapped children within its
jurisdiction, and that the district court's rulings placed
an unwarranted obligation to pay for hospitalization on
Clovis Unified that Congress did not intend.
Generally, the facts were not disputed and are
briefly recited as follows.

Michelle S. was a ten-year-old

girl who was seriously emotionally disturbed and was
entitled to special education and related services.

Both

Michelle's parents and Clovis Unified stipulated that she
was in need of residential placement in order to receive an
appropriate education.
Michelle S. was born in 1977 and adopted in 1981.
In 1982, at age five, she exhibited severe emotional
disturbances in the public schools of the state of
Washington.

She was hospitalized for two months for

emotional difficulties in late 1983.
In June 1984, Michelle

s.

and her family moved to

Riverside, California, where she was placed in a mental
health day treatment center because of her tantrums and
destructive behavior.

From there she was placed in a mental

health residential treatment program.

This program offered

a special education day class which included a full
instructional day.

In this program, Michelle S. performed

at grade level.
In January 1985, Michelle S.'s parents moved to
Fresno while Michelle S. remained in Riverside.

Michelle

s.
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continued to perform adequately in her special education day
class; however, her emotional condition deteriorated.

In

March 1985, the Riverside Mental Health Residential
Treatment Program gave notice that it could no longer meet
the needs of Michelle S. and recommended that she be placed
in a licensed acute care facility.

In mid-March 1985,

King's View Hospital, a licensed acute care psychiatric
hospital located in Reedley, a rural community near Fresno,
accepted Michelle S.

The Kings Canyon Unified School

District became the educational agency responsible for the
special educational program for Michelle

s.

Kings View

Hospital is located within that district's boundaries.
Kings Canyon Unified's educational expenses were borne by
Clovis Unified, as mandated by state procedures, based on
the parents' residence in the Clovis Unified School
District.
It must be noted that Michelle S.'s parents
unilaterally placed Michelle S. at Kings View because of the
acute psychological care she required.

The residential/

medical fees were paid by the parents' medical insurance.
In July 1985, the parents' medical insurance ran out.
In July 1985, Michelle S.'s parents notified Clovis
Unified that they wanted Clovis Unified to pay for the
residential costs of Michelle S.'s placement at Kings View
Hospital because their domicile was within the attendance
boundaries of the Clovis Unified School District.
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The parents of Michelle S. and Clovis Unified
administrators met and discussed alternative placements.
Clovis Unified first recommended a State Diagnostic School,
a temporary residential placement located in Fresno, which
could provide additional evaluation information on
Michelle's educational needs.

A second recommendation was

Re-Ed West, a residential school located in Sacramento,
California, which provides an intensive educational program
for severely emotionally disturbed children, including a
six-hour-a-day instructional program coordinated with a
counseling and residential program.

When no alternative

placement was agreed to by the parents, they filed for an
administrative hearing requesting placement at Kings View at
the expense of Clovis Unified.
After the administrative hearing was held, the
independent hearing officer ruled that Michelle

s.

should be

placed at Kings View for the 1985-86 school year (Civil No.
CV~F-479

E.D.D., U.S. Dist. Crt., Eastern District of

California).

In September 1985, Clovis Unified filed for a

temporary restraining order in the

u.s.

District Court; the

motion was denied.
Clovis Unified, with the assistance of the State
Department of Education, sought a trial date in October
1985.

A date was set, then postponed until March 1986.

An interesting and further complicating factor was
introduced into the Michelle S. case when Kings View
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Hospital was found to have strong affiliations with the
Mennonite Church and that pastoral assessments and
counseling were part of the overall treatment program.
Since state law does not allow for the certification of
sectarian nonpublic schools and agencies, the State
Department of Education withdrew Kings View's certification
(California, Education Code 1980, 56365 et. seq.).

When

Clovis Unified tried to add the issue of the sectarian
status of Kings View as an amended complaint for the March
1986 trial date, the district court denied the amended
complaint addition.
The trial was held, and in June and July 1986, the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered by the
district court, as was a judgment for Michelle S.
The district court's denial of motions for a new
trial and amendments for Findings of Facts and Conclusions
of Law led Clovis Unified to file an appeal with the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

u.s.

The final district

court action was to grant a stay of execution judgment in
December 1986.
Limitations
This study is limited to presenting, discussing,
analyzing, and considering the law dealing specifically with
appropriate special education placements and special
education-related services, especially the medical services
limitation statement in P.L. 94-142.

An examination and
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consideration of special education costs that the Congress
and subsequent judicial interpretations meant to include and
exclude under the law are also presented.
The issues present in the Michelle S. case lead to
the following questions, which this study analyzes.
1.

Must public school districts pay under the

Education of the Handicapped Act (EAHCA) for the costs of
psychiatric hospitalization for severely emotionally
disturbed patients of school age?
2.

May a district court order a public education

agency to pay more than is necessary to confer some
education benefit?
3.

May a district court ignore a state's special

education delivery system and a state's standards for
educating handicapped children in nonpublic residential
facilities?
4.

May a district court refuse to consider the

comparative costs for residential placements and for
hospitalization?
5.

May a district court ignore the sectarian nature

of nonpublic residential or psychiatric hospitalization?
The formal answers to these questions were
ultimately provided by the Ninth Circuit Court, but the
intent of P.L. 94-142 and legal precedence in similar
district court, appellate court, and landmark

u.s.

Supreme

Court decisions indicated that it would have been a complete
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departure from the evolving interpretation of special
education case law regarding appropriate special education
placement-related services, and costs of special education.
This study also presents a summary of litigation
costs required to take such a case as Michelle S. to trial
and through appeals for final resolution.

The intent in

doing so is to inform and/or remind public school
administrators of the potential financial resource drain
inherent in not understanding or implementing the law as
Congress intended or as legal interpretation precedence
leads.

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
Historical Perspective
The early history of the handicapped is primarily an
unpleasant story of misunderstanding and mistreatment based
on fear and superstition.

According to Gearhart (1980), the

pre-Christian era was marked with the common practices of
abandonment or death for young children who were "defective"
(26).

While periodic attempts to improve the lot of the

handicapped occurred, this variable treatment of the
handicapped continued for centuries, until the late 1700s.
Special Schools: Institutionalization
In the early 1800s a permanent change for the better
was initiated.

Special schools were established to serve

the deaf, the blind, the mentally retarded, and to a limited
extent, the mentally ill. Throughout the 1880s, institutions
for the handicapped were established in Europe and the
United States. The institutional setting seemed to be the
logical place for the handicapped, with a few individuals
returning to mainstream society, but with most remaining
institutionalized for life.
Lilly (1979), in examining historical and
traditional perspectives of handicapped education, pointed
13
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out that a link between intelligence measurement and the
pervasive effects of intelligence on many aspects of social
behavior caused treatment and control systems to be
established that stressed separation of the handicapped from
the normal population.

This tendency, he claimed, was

difficult to overcome.

"It is difficult to maintain that

the early 1900's was a pleasant time to live for a person
with low measured intelligence or a handicapping condition"
(Lilly 1979, 6).
Exclusionary Doctrine
An historical assessment of the educational rights

of handicapped children prior to 1970 also provides a mixed
picture of some supportive state legislative mandates and an
entrenched exclusionary legal doctrine created by state
lawmakers and supported by various levels of the judiciary
(Data Research, Inc. 1987, 1).
Pruitt (1983, 1) found that New Jersey in 1911, New
York in 1917, and Massachusetts in 1920 had produced
legislative mandates addressing the needs of the
handicapped.

These generally were permissive in nature and

interpreted as so by local school districts.
In contrast, the exclusionary legal doctrine
established by state lawmakers and judiciaries supported a
general public view that many handicapped children should
not be educated in the public schools.

Many handicapped

students were generally denied access to public schools
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under state laws which excused them from compulsory
attendance and removed from public school officials any
legal duty to grant them the same access that nonhandicapped
students enjoyed (Johnson 1986, 1).

These laws expressed

society's belief that handicapped children could not benefit
from education and that their presence in the public schools
would have an adverse effect on the welfare of other
students.
For example, Alaskan law excluded children with
"bodily or mental conditions rendering attendance
inadvisable" (Alaska 1971, Statutes, Title 14, chap. 30).
Nevada's law allowed exclusion when the child's "physical or
mental condition or attitude (was] such as to prevent or
render inadvisable his attendance at school or his
application to study" (Nevada 1963, Revised Statutes, sec.
392.050).

Virginia's compulsory attendance statute included

an exemption for "children physically or mentally
incapacitated for school work" (Code of Virginia 1973, sec.
22.275.3).
Earlier judicial reviews found the courts permissive
and supportive of the legal doctrine of exclusion from
public education of the handicapped.

In 1893, a

Massachusetts court affirmed a school committee's exclusion
of a handicapped child because he was "so weak in mind as
not to derive any marked benefit from instruction and
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further, that he [was] so troublesome to other children"
(Watson v. City of Cambridge 1863, 864).
His physical condition and ailment produces a depressing
and nauseating effect upon the teachers and school
children, • • • he takes up an undue portion of the
teacher's time and attention, distracts attention of
other pupils, and interferes generally with the
discipline and progress of the school (Beattie v. Board
of Education of City of Antigo 1919, 153-54).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized that the boy had a
constitutional right to attend public school.

The court

held, however, that the school board had the legal authority
and, in this

ca~e,

the duty to exclude the boy.
Special Classes

Gearhart (1980, 26) explained that as the twentieth
century dawned, a new point of view was adopted regarding
the proper physical setting for the education of the
handicapped.

It was proposed that, rather than sending

handicapped children to separate schools or institutions,
they should be provided special classes within the public
schools.

This special class concept became the accepted

service mode until the mid-1960s.
Growth of Categories Served
Other significant changes that were happening
included the growth of categories of handicaps that were
being serviced in these special classes in public schools.
In the 1930s one new area of handicapped education that came
into its own was public school education of children with
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"mild emotional disturbances" or behavior disorders.

Until

this time, programs for the emotionallly disturbed had been
primarily residential. Treatment had been largely
psychiatric in nature, and the residential centers for the
emotionally disturbed had tended toward segregation,
depersonalization, and often cruel custodial care.

The

increased demands on school-based services resulted in a
large number of special classes for children who were judged
as too disruptive for the regular classroom setting (Lilly
1979, 6).
Least Restrictive Environment
During the 1960s and increasingly in the 1970s, the
concept of mainstreaming, or return to the least restrictive
environment, became popular.

A similar movement paralleled

the mainstreaming concept in public schools, and that was
the "normalization" process of the institutionalized.
Basically, the movement was deinstitutionalization and
return to the home community whenever possible (Gearhart
1980, 26).
Gearhart (1980, 27) explained that while
"mainstreaming" and "normalization" were general trends,
there was also a movement toward more services for more of
the handicapped population, all provided at public expense.
Promoted primarily by advocacy organizations of parents and
professional special education associations, this increase
in service was stimulated further by litigation which
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spotlighted denial of equal rights to the handicapped and by
legislation that made it mandatory for public agencies to
serve the handicapped.
Mandated Services
This significant increase in the scope of the
mandated services to be provided, coupled with a different
frame of reference for the provision of these services,
i.e., special classes, increasing interest in special
education, and increasing litigation, was the status quo at
the start of 1975.

The end of an era was at hand.

This dawn of a new era and a different frame of
reference was the same issue addressed by Schimmel (1983, 1)
in his study of the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act of 1975 (EAHCA).
In 1966, an ad hoc subcommittee on the Education and
Labor Committee of the House of Representatives turned its
attention to the needs of the handicapped and detailed the
need for support of the education of handicapped children:
The Subcommittee reported that only abut one-third of
the approximately 5.5 million handicapped children were
being provided an appropriate special education. The
remaining two-thirds were either totally excluded from
schools or sitting idly in regular classrooms awaiting
the time when they were old enough to "drop out." The
Subcommittee also learn that Federal programs directed
at handicapped children were minimal, fractionated,
uncoordinated, and frequently given a low priority in
the education community (U.S. Congress, House 1975, 2).
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ESEA Amendments of 1966
On the basis of this information, Congress
reorganized the inadequate educational opportunities for
handicapped children by enacting the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act (ESEA) Amendments of 1966.

Congress

provided a new Title VI, which began a program of grants to
states in order to assist states in the education of
handicapped children (Pruitt 1983, 2).

Congress also

created a National Advisory Committee on Handicapped
Children and a Bureau of Education for the Handicapped in
the

u.s.

Department of Education (Schimmel 1983, 2).

Title

VI was repealed in 1971 and replaced with the ESEA
Amendments of 1970.

Under these amendments, a separate act

was created, entitled the Education of the Handicapped Act
of 1970 (Pruitt 1983, 2).
Congress remained active in introducing legislation
supportive of education for the handicapped throughout the
early 1970s.

In 1974, P.L. 93-380 (ESEA Amendments of 1974)

was signed into law (Pruitt 1983, 2).

According to the

Senate committee,
this legislation was originally introduced as Senate
3614 on May 16, 1972. It followed a series of landmark
court cases establishing in law the right to education
for all handicapped children. Since those initial
decisions in 1971 and 1972 and with similar decisions in
27 states, it is clear today that this "right to
education" is no longer in question (U.S. Congress,
Senate 1975, 6).
By 1971, thirty-three states had adopted supportive
legislation for the handicapped, and by 1975, most states

20

had some form of mandatory legislation regarding the
handicapped, but such legislation carried little or no
enforcement mechanism (Pruitt 1983, 1).
Brown v. Board of Education
Congressional and judicial recognition of the
education rights of the handicapped has relied heavily on
Brown v. Board of Education (1954).

In Brown, the United

States Supreme Court established the right to equal
education by stating that equal opportunity for education
and the protection of law could not result in separate but
equal schools.

The court emphasized the importance of

education in American society:
Education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments. Compulsory school
attendance laws and the great expenditures for education
both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of
education to our democratic society. It is required in
the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities • • • • It is the very foundation of
good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him
for later professional training, and in helping him to
adjust normally to his environment. For these days, it
is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity to an
education (Brown v. Board of Education 1954, 483, 493).
Two judicial decisions which may have started the
process that led to the adoption by Congress of the EAHCA of
1975 were PARC v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in 1971, a
suit on behalf of retarded students decided by a U.S.
district court in Pennsylvania, and Mills v. Board of
Education, a 1972 decision in favor of all students excluded
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from access to a public education in the District of
Columbia.
PARC v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
The Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children
(PARC) brought a class action suit on behalf of all retarded
students between the ages of six and twenty-one who were
being excluded from public education by the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania.

The goal of the suit was to establish the

legal right of the retarded for access to a public
education.

Lawyer T. K. Gilhool argued violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment Equal and Protection and Due Process
Clauses and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Constitution
because it promised a public education for all children
(PARC v. Pennsylvania 1972, 279).

The district court did

not have to render a decision because a Consent Agreement
was drafted by the Pennsylvania attorney general that
allowed placement of each mentally retarded student in a
free public program of education and training appropriate to
the student's capacity.

Basically, the Consent Agreement

allowed for the following: identification of mentally
regarded students, provisions for educational services,
parental notification, hearings with parents when
educational placement was being changed, explanation of all
procedures to parents, parental access to all student
records, and parental review of appropriateness of an
educational program.

These provisions are the basic
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underpinnings for current federal criteria in providing a
FAPE.
Mills v. Board of Education
In the District of Columbia, seven students who were
retarded and who were excluded from public schools sued for
their own rights and the rights of similar students who were
being excluded from access to public education.

The

District of Columbia school district board admitted
responsibility, but claimed insufficient funds to provide
education to all handicapped children.

Only 3,880 of 18,000

identified mentally retarded students in the district were
being served (Mills v. Board of Education 1972, 887-83).
The

u.s.

district court ruled summarily for the

plaintiffs in 1972.

The District of Columbia was violating

the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the

u.s.

Constitution by denying handicapped children access to
public education while providing it to others.

The

resulting mandated program required the District of Columbia
to locate (identify), to provide constitutionally adequate
prior due process hearings on placement, to ensure periodic
reviews of status and progress, and finally, to provide
access to public education for all handicapped children, not
just the mentally retarded (Mills v. Board of Education
1972, 877-83).
These two decisions opened public schools to all
handicapped children.

The subsequent requirements led to
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greatly expanded special education programs, and sharp
increases in school budgets.

Advocates for the handicapped

and various state education department officials turned to
the Congress of the United States to find some of the money
needed to meet the increased number of special education
needs.
Congress responded to the need for more federal
money to aid states in educating handicapped students.
Specifically, they passed new grant programs and laws
intended to guarantee legal rights for handicapped students.
These laws--the Rehabilitation Act of 1975 (sec. 504) and
P.L. 94-142 (EABCA)--imposed on public schools of every
state comprehensive legal responsibilities for education for
the handicapped.

These two laws are the basis for hundreds

·Of federal and state court decisions regarding the education
of the handicapped (Johnson 1986, 5).
The PARC and Mills cases greatly increased the
pressure on Congress to spend even more federal money on
state public school programs for handicapped children.
Based on the results of those two litigations and similar
cases in other states, Congress enacted two federal laws
that have established the legal basis for states in
providing every handicapped child with an appropriate
education at public expense.
These two laws--the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(sec. 504) and P.L. 94-142 (EABCA)--are both based on
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Congress's power to spend federal money for the general
welfare and to regulate the way states use the federal funds
they receive.

Congress lacks constitutional power to

regulate directly the public schools of the fifty states,
but it has discovered that its legislative intent can be
enforced by ensuring that federal funds are used to promote
the general welfare or equal opportunity and protection
under the law.
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973
Section 504 is not a federal grant program; it
provides no money to aid handicapped persons.

It does

impose a duty on every recipient of federal funds not to
discriminate against handicapped persons.

The Office of

Civil Rights (OCR) serves as the enforcement agency of the
act.

The OCR generally investigates complaints that allege

violations of Section 504.

The procedures of investigation

are called "compliance reviews."

The Section 504 issues

that have most often attracted the OCR's education of
handicapped interest include the following: locating and
identifying handicapped children, notifying parents of
rights and services available, proving program accessibility
to students with orthopedic and sensory impairments, and
making educational placements and changes in placements of
handicapped children.

The OCR provides written reports of

its complaint investigations and its compliance reviews.
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The agency's view of the requirements of the law are
published in a specialized law reporter entitled Education
for the Handicapped Law Report (EHLR).
Congress did not explicitly provide Section 504 a
judicial enforcement through a "private right of action."
However, various Supreme Court decisions have held that
persons may sue to enforce their rights under Section 504.
In Smith v. Robinson, the court held that a plaintiff may
not use Section 504 to circumvent the extensive
administrative procedures required by the EAHCA if the suit
concerns the child's right to a free appropriate education
(Smith v. Robinson 1984, 3457).
The Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of
1975 (EAHCA) is a federal grant program that provides
substantial sums of federal money to states and local school
districts to pay part of the cost of educating handicapped
students in elementary and secondary schools.

The EAHCA

(P.L. 94-142) is an unusually detailed statute that sets
forth a specific, complex, and comprehensive design that
states must follow to qualify for the federal funds that the
law authorizes.

P.L. 94-142 requires that states have a

policy assuring a free appropriate education to all
handicapped children, effective september 1, 1978.

The

state's policy must provide expanded due process rights for
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parents and children, including the right to appeal
disagreements to an independent hearing officer, and the
state policy must provide the right to sue.

A state,

further, must guarantee the development of an individualized
education plan (IEP) to guide each handicapped student's
education (Johnson 1986, 12).
The EAHCA (P.L. 94-142) is administratively enforced
by the Office of Special Education Programs in the U.S.
Department of Education's Office of Special Education and
Rehabilitation Services.

Coordinated writing of Section 504

and EAHCA regulations and a memorandum of understanding
between the OCR and the Office of Special Education Programs
have done much to achieve effective, efficient, and
consistent application of the two enforcement agencies.

In

the EAHCA, Congress explicitly provided for parents to file
individual law suits, if necessary, to gain free appropriate
education for a handicapped child.

Congress also required

parents to complete specific administrative appeal processes
before seeking judicial intervention.
The heart of P.L. 94-142 is revealed in its purpose
statement (EAHCA 1980, sec. 1400 (c)).

In essence, this act

mandates that states are to seek out, identify, and
guarantee a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to
every handicapped child.
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FAPE Definition
The specific definition of a FAPE is as follows:
The term "free appropriate public education" means
special education and related services which (a) have
been provided at public expense, under public
supervision and direction, and without charge, (b) meet
the standards of the State education agency, (c) include
an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary
education in the State involved, and (d) are provided in
conformity with the individualized education program
(IEP) required under section 1414 (a) (5) of this title
(EAHCA 1980, sec. 1401 (a) (18)).
This FAPE is intended to allow the nation's
handicapped citizens to have full equality of opportunity,
where before as many as half of the nation's handicapped
were not receiving appropriate educational services.

The

act also states that it is in the national interest that the
federal government assist state and local efforts to provide
programs to meet the educational needs of handicapped
children in order to assure equal protection of the law
(EAHCA 1980, sec. 1400 (b)).
Handicapped Children Definition
The act has made very clear who the clientele are to
be as it defines handicapped children as follows:
The term "handicapped children" means mentally retarded,
hard of hearing, deaf, speech or emotionally disturbed,
orthopedically impaired, visually handicapped, seriously
emotionally disturbed, orthopedically impaired, or other
health impaired children, or children with specific
learning disabilities, who by reason thereof require
special education and related services (EAHCA 1980, sec.
1401 (a)(1)).
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Specific Learning Disabilities
Definition
To clarify even further the phrase regarding
specific learning disabilities in the previous paragraph, a
definition has been further delineated in the act:
The term "children with specific learning disabilities"
means those children who have a disorder in one or more
of the basic psychological processes involved in
understanding or in using language, spoken or written,
which disorder may manifest itself in imperfect ability
to listen, think, speak, read, write, spell, or do
mathematical calculations. Such disorders include such
conditions as perceptual handicaps, brain injury,
minimal brain dysfunction, dyslexia, and developmental
aphasia. Such term does not include children who have
learning problems which are primarily the result of
visual, hearing, or motor handicaps, of mental
retardation, of emotional disturbance, or of
environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantage (EAHCA
1980, sec. 1401 (a) (15)).
Special Education Definition
In setting out its goal for a FAPE for all
handicapped children, Congress has also been very specific
in describing the process in how this goal was to be
achieved.

The act clearly stated that a FAPE consists of

special education and related services.

The act defines

special education as follows:
The term "special education" means specially designed
instruction, at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet
the unique needs of a handicapped child, including
classroom instruction, instruction in physical
education, home instruction, and instruction in
hospitals and institutions (EAHCA 1980, sec. 1401 (a)
( 16) ) •
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Related Services Definition
Related services were also clearly stipulated.
The term "related services" means transportation, and
such developmental, corrective, and other supportive
services (including speech pathology and audiology,
psychological services, physical and occupational
therapy, recreation, and medical and counseling
services, except that such medical services shall be for
diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be
required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from
special education, and includes the early identification
and assessment of handicapping conditions in children
(EAHCA 1980, sec. 1401 (o) (17)).
On August 5, 1986, President Reagan signed into law

s.

415, the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986,

the so-called Attorney's Fees Bill.
reversed the

u.s.

The urgency law

Supreme Court Smith v. Robinson decision

of July 5, 1984, and authorized courts to award reasonable
fees to parents who, after having exhausted administrative
procedures, prevailed in EAHCA civil court actions or
administrative due process proceedings.

This new public

law, P.L. 99-372, protected children's rights to a free
appropriate public education.

The law was to be retroactive

to all cases pending as of July 3, 1984, or decided between
July 4, 1984, and August 5, 1984.

The law also allowed

filing of civil actions under laws other than P.L. 94-142,
ao long as parents first exhausted administrative remedies
ttnder P.L. 94-142 (Hinkle 1986, 3).
The provisions of P.L. 99-372 were included in the
BAHCA in sees. 1415 (e) (4) and 1415 (f).

The EAHCA (EHA)

was retitled on October 30, 1990, to become the Individuals
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with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (Data Research, 1991,
295).
California Historical Handicapped
Education
The California development of special programs for
the education of the handicapped had its origins in private
charitable efforts and has moved steadily to the present era
of public school responsibility.

The evaluation of services

matches in many ways the growth of handicapped education as
depicted for the nation by Gearhart (1980) and Lilly (1979).
Special Schools and
Classes
Special education in California began in 1860 when,
by the authorization of the legislature, a residential
school for the deaf was established in San Francisco (State
of California, Department of Finance 1977, 1).

In 1865,

funds were authorized for a combined school for the blind
and deaf, and such a school was established in Berkeley.
The city of Los Angeles pioneered speech classes in the
public school program in 1897, by opening a public day class
for deaf children.

Within the next three years, similar

classes were opeqed in San Francisco and Oakland (Simmons
1973, 20).
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Increased Categories
of Service
In 1907, a law was passed making it permissible for
school districts to establish visual systems of instruction
for deaf pupils.

During the next ten years, special

education classes for deaf, hard of hearing, blind, and
speech handicapped were instituted in several of the larger
school districts in the state.

By 1921, school districts

were given authority to establish special classes for
mentally retarded students (State of California, Assembly
1965, 14).

The permissive authorization was not enough

impetus for most districts.
Day Classes Versus
Residential Schools
Experiences with special education for handicapped
children during the first quarter of this century seemed to
demonstrate that such children could be more successfully
educated in day classes than in residential schools.
addition, cost was considerably less.

In

Parents began to

demand extended school facilities for their disabled
youngsters, and such private organizations as the California
Society for Crippled Children and the American Hearing
Society began to press for legislative provisions that would
give additional financial support to school districts to
help defray the cost of educating the handicapped.
In 1927, the California Legislature enacted laws
allowing reimbursement to school districts for the excess
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costs of educating the handicapped.

From the beginning,

school districts had not seen education of such children as
their duty; the districts had tended to think of it as a
state responsibility, to be shouldered by themselves only
with state financing.

As the state began to identify and

provide services to more educationally handicapped children,
the County Offices of Education became the prime coordinator
of such programs; a fact which is still evident today.

The

1927 laws provided that governing boards might offer
education suitable to the needs of the blind, deaf, hard of
hearing, crippled, and such other physically handicapped
individuals as the superintendent of public instruction
might designate.

The cost to local districts would be

reimbursed by half the actual excess expense, not to exceed
$100 per unit of average daily attendance (State of
California, Assembly 1965, 14).
During the next twenty years only minor changes were
made in financing the various programs for handicapped
students.

Two of the changes were increasing excess cost to

the total amount spent for remedial and individual
instruction of physically handicapped pupils, and
designating a minimum day of attendance as 240 minutes.
By 1940, the Education Code contained authorization
for the establishment of special education programs for all
types of physically handicapped pupils and for the mentally
retarded, and additionally, the state of California was
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reimbursing local districts for part of the excess costs;
however, relatively few school districts established classes
for the handicapped.
At the same time, private agencies interested in the
handicapped began to champion the cause of better education
for California's youth, whether handicapped or not.

With

education costs rising, school administrators were reluctant
to establish new and expensive school programs and contended
that greater state subsidies were the answer to education
for the exceptional.
Interested lay groups persisted in their efforts
until 1945, when the California Senate appointed an interim
committee to study mental deficiency.

In this same year a

new group of physically impaired children were brought into
the school program, namely, the cerebral palsied.

Not only

were excess costs reimbursed to school districts for the
education of the cerebral palsied, but residential schools
were also established (State of California, Assembly 1965,
15) •
In 1947, the California State Department of
Education established the Bureau of Special Education.

This

bureau together with more laws began to accomplish the
following: made it mandatory for school districts to provide
or contract for educational facilities for physically
handicapped children, increased the reimbursement for excess
expenses in educating the physically handicapped,
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established County School Service Funds to provide for the
physically handicapped who otherwise would not receive an
education, made it permissible for physically handicapped
children to enter special day classes at age three, and
finally, made it mandatory for schools to establish and
maintain special training classes for mentally retarded
minors.
Moreover, funds were made available to reimburse
districts for up to 75 percent of excess costs for educating
the mentally retarded.

A quarter of a million dollars was

also provided to assist local schools and districts to
construct special classes for the cerebral palsied.

A

special appropriation was made for San Francisco State
College to develop a teacher education program in all fields
of exceptionality.
Mandatory Programs
The enactment of the mandatory laws created
additional problems for public school administrators, whose
responsibilities were already being increased by a
tremendous growth in school enrollment due to the population
influx, but the added state support for the education of the
handicapped was of considerable assistance.

Special class

programs for both physically and mentally handicapped
students began to show a decided increase.

State excess

cost reimbursements for special programs operating during
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the 1947-48 school year rose to new heights and reflected an
increase in the number of handicapped pupils being served.
The four years between 1947 and 1951 showed even
greater activity in special education.

Thousands of

mentally and physically handicapped pupils were provided
for, and the amount of state funds expended for the program
doubled.
The period from 1953 to 1963 brought additional
expansion of special education programs, and increased state
reimbursement.

In 1963, a major change in California's

system of special education came when the legislature
authorized school districts to establish programs for the
educationally handicapped.

These programs were originally

intended for students who were at least two years behind
their school work and for students with severe behavioral
problems, but were later expanded to include children with
severe emotional disturbances (California Legislative
Analyst 1968, 10).
The range of programs existing by 1965 was described
as follows: regular day classes and remedial classes.
types were specially reimbursable.

Both

For more specialized

services, there were resource classes, special day classes,
separate public schools, individual instruction at home or
in a hospital, schools and/or classes in institutions or
sanitariums, and residential schools.

The state also

eventually enumerated fifteen special groups to be served by
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the programs listed above: trainable retarded, educable
retarded, blind, partially sighted, deaf, hard of hearing,
speech defective, aphasic, cerebral palsied, orthopedically
handicapped, those with lowered organic vitality, those with
other illnesses and physical conditions, educationally
handicapped, gifted, and culturally disadvantaged (State of
California, Assembly 1965, 18).
In 1965, the legislature authorized county
superintendents of schools to establish Development Centers
for Handicapped Minors as continuing programs.

These

centers were designed for severely mentally retarded,
physically handicapped, and multihandicapped children who,
without such programs, would have been either
institutionalized or without educational programs
altogether.

A principal purpose of such programs was to

relieve parents from the constant care of such children so
that they could seek employment (State of California,
Department of Finance 1977, 2).
Part 30 of the Education Code was rewritten in 1980,
primarily by Senate Bill 1870 (Rodda) (Chapter 797), and
became law on July 28, 1980.

This legislation repealed all

former special education categorical programs and the Master
Plan for Special Education program Education Code sections
that were in effect on January 1, 1980.

The legislation

also restructured and added code sections implementing the
Master Plan for Special Education statewide.

Since the
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passage of S.B. 1870, eighty-three legislative measures have
modified California's special education statutes.
Paul Hinkle, special education consultant for the
Special Education Division of the California Department of
Education, has published sixteen consecutive issues of
California Special Education Programs: A Composite of Laws.
Each year Education Code-Part 30 is revised with new laws
enacted since the previous printed year.

Additionally, this

publication has grown to include other special educationrelated laws, e.g., the California Code of Regulations,
Title 5, and Special Education pertinent references in the
Health and Safety and Welfare and Institutions Codes.

Since

the passage of S.B. 1870, eighty-three legislative measures
have modified California's special education statutes
(Hinkle 1994, iii).

CHAPTER III
REVIEW OF THE LEGAL LITERATURE
A computerized legal search was conducted using
WESTLAW-BASIC services.

Queries were formulated using Title

20 of the U.S. Code, sec. 1400, the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA), and the following were the
specific locator terms: "related services," "medical
services," and "hospitalization."

The queries with the

indicators listed above were computer searched in the
ALLFEDS database, or the combined federal cases, including
cases from the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. courts of
appeal, and U.S. district courts dealing with these
parameters.

The resulting citation listing provided thirty-

seven cases that had relevant or parallel issues regarding
hospital placement as necessary related services to provide
special education (see Table 1).

The time span covered in

the ALLFEDS search provided cases from 1978 to 1987.
Subsequent review of federal case law after 1987 has
provided additional cases that have relevant or parallel
issues and are as recent as the early 1990s.
A similar search was done using WESTLAW-BASIC
computer services with queries for California Supreme Court
and courts of appeal case law.
38

The resultant citations
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Table 1.

ALLFEDS Citations from Computerized Legal Search
(WESTLAW-BASIC) Locator Terms: Related Services,
Medical Services, and Hospitalization
Citations

1.

U.S. 1984. Irving Independent School Dist. v. Tatro,
104 s.ct. 3371.

2.

U.S.N.Y. 1982. Board of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson
Central School Dist. Bd. of Westchester County v.
Rowley, 102 S.Ct. 3034.

3.

C.A.Ill. 1985.

4.

C.A.D.C. 1984. Lunceford v. District of Columbia Bd.
of Educ., 745 F.2d 1577.

5.

C.A.Pa. 1981.
665 F.2d 443.

6.

C.A.Del. 1981. Kruelle v. New Castle County School
Dist., 642 F.2d 687.

7.

C.A.Tex. 1980.

8.

C.A.N.Y. 1980. Rowley v. Board of Ed. of Hendrick
Hudson Central School Dist., 632 F.2d 945.

9.

C.A.Pa. 1980.

Parks v. Pavkovic, 753 F.2d 1397.

Takarcik v. Forest Bills School Dist.,

Tatro v. State of Texas, 625 F.2d 557.

Battle v. Com. of Pa., 629 F.2d 269.

10.

S.D.Ohio 1987.

McNair v. Cardimone, 676 F.Supp. 1361.

11.

D.D.N.Y. 1987.
1015.

Vander Malle v. Ambach, 667 F.Supp.

12.

W.D.Pa. 1987.
F.Supp. 71.

13.

W.D.N.Y. 1987.
F.Supp. 1405.

14.

D.Mass. 1987.

15.

W.D.N.Y. 1986.
F.Supp. 1564.

16.

N.D.N.Y. 1986. Detsel by Detsel v. Board of Educ. of
Auburn Enlarged City School Dist., 637 F.Supp. 1022.

Bevin B. by Michael B. v. Wright, 666
Antkowiak by Antkowiak v. Ambach, 653
Doe v. Anrig, 651 F.Supp. 424.
Antkowiak by Antkowiak v. Ambach, 638
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(continued)
Citations

17.

D.C.N.Y. 1985.
F.Supp. 975.

Antkowiak by Antkowiak v. Ambach, 621

18.

D.C.Mass. 1985.
687.

Com. of Mass. v. Heckler, 616 F.Supp.

19.

D.C.Tenn. 1985.

Seals v. Loftis, 614 F.Supp. 302.

20.

D.C.Ill. 1984.

21.

D.C.N.J. 1983. T.G. on Behalf of D.G. v. Board of
Educ. of Piscataway, N.J., 576 F.Supp. 420.

22.

D.C.Ill. 1983. Darlene L. v. Illinois State Bd. of
Educ., 568 F.Supp. 1340.

23.

D.C.D.C. 1983.

24.

D.C.Mo. 1983. Yaris v. Special School Dist. of St.
Louis County, 558 F.Supp. 545.

25.

D.C.Tex. 1982. Stacey G. by William and Jane G. v.
Pasadena Independent School Dist., 547 F.Supp. 61.

26.

D.C.Cal. 1982. Christopher T. v. San Francisco Unif.
School Dist., 553 F.Supp. 1107.

27.

D.C.Ill. 1982.

WilliamS. v. Gill, 536 F.Supp. 505.

28.

D.C.Ill. 1980.

Gary B. v. Cronin, 542 F.Supp. 102.

29.

D.C.Ill. 1982.

Parks v. Pavkovic, 536 F.Supp. 296.

30.

D.C.Tex. 1982. Ruth Anne M. v. Alvin Independent
School Dist., 532 F.Supp. 460.

31.

D.C.Tex. 1981. Gladys J. v. Pearland Independent
School Dist., 520 F.Supp. 869.

32.

D.C.Tex. 1981.
968.

33.

D.C.Conn. 1981.
F.Supp. 68.

Max M. v. Thompson, 592 F.Supp. 1437.

McKenzie v. Jefferson, 566 F.Supp. 404.

Tatro v. State of Tex., 516 F.Supp.
Papacoda v. State of Connecticut, 528
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(continued)
Citations

34.

D.C.Colo. 1981. Association for Retarded Citizens in
Colorado v. Frazier, 517 F.Supp. 105.

35.

D.C.Va. 1981.

36.

D.C.Tex. 1979.
1224.

37.

D.C.N.Y. 1978. Lora v. Board of Ed. of City of New
York, 456 F.Supp. 1211.

Pinkerton v. Moye, 509 F.Supp. 107.
Tatro v. State of Tex., 481 F.Supp.
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listed twenty-six California cases which mentioned or dealt
with special education-related services and hospitalization
as a special education placement (see Table 2).

The time

frame for the California study provided related case law
from 1967 to 1987.

Additional research of California case

law revealed cases which have parallel issues.
In the case at hand, Michelle

s., the primary issue

to be resolved was whether Michelle's hospitalization at
Kings View Hospital constituted a "residential placement" or
a "related service" which her local school district was
required to pay for under the EAHCA or whether the placement
constituted "medical services" excluded from the purview of
the EAHCA (Clovis Unified School District v. California
Office of Administrative Hearings 1990, 4811).
Residential Placement
The EAHCA indirectly requires school districts to
provide residential placements by defining elementary and
secondary schools to include "residential schools" (EAHCA
1980, sec. 1401 (a) (9-10)).

There is no further

explanation in the EAHCA, but the pertinent regulations
provide that
if placement in a public or private residential program
~s necessary to provide special education and related
services to a handicapped child, the program, including
non-medical care and room and board, must be at no cost
to the parents of the child (34 C.F.R., sec. 300.302).
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Table 2.

California Case Law Citations from Computerized
Legal Search (WESTLAW-BASIC) Locator Terms:
Special Education, Related Services, and
Hospitalization Placement
Citations

1.

Cal.App. 3 Dist. 1987.
732.

White v. State, 240 Cal.Rptr.

2.

Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1986. Fisher v. Superior Court (Alpha
Therapeutic Corp.), 223 Cal.Rptr. 203.

3.

Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1985. Planned Parenthood Affiliates
of California v. Swoap, 219 Cal.Rptr. 664.

4.

Cal. 1985. State Personnel Bd. v. Fair Employment and
Housing Com'n (Amon), 217 Cal.Rptr. 16.

5.

Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1985.
557.

6.

Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1985. Davey Tree Surgery Co. v.
Occupational Safety and Health Appeals Bd. (Div. of
Occupational Safety and Health), 213 Cal.Rptr. 806.

7.

Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1984. Keech v. Berkeley Unified
School Dist., 204 Cal.Rptr. 7.

8.

Cal.App. 4 Dist. 1984. Byrnes v. Riles (Capistrano
Unified School Dist.), 204 Cal.Rptr. 100.

9.

Cal.App. 3 Dist. 1983. Nevada County Office of Educ.
v. Superintendent of Public Instruction, 197 Cal.Rptr.
152.

In re John K., 216 Cal.Rptr.

10.

Cal.App. 1982. Erzinger v. Regents of University of
California, 187 Cal.Rptr. 164.

11.

Cal. 1982.

12.

Cal. 1982. American Nat. Ins. Co. v. Fair Employment
and Housing Com'n, 186 Cal.Rptr. 345.

13.

Cal.App. 1982. Erzinger v. Regents of University of
California, 185 Cal.Rptr. 791.

14.

Cal.App. 1982. Newport-Mesa Unified School Dist. of
Orange County v. Hubert, 183 Cal.Rptr. 334.

Serrano v. Unruh, 186 Cal.Rptr. 754.
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Table 2 (continued)
Citations
15.

Cal.App. 1982. San Francisco Unified School Dist. v.
State, 182 Cal.Rptr. 525.

16.

Cal.App. 1981. American Nat. Ins. Co. v. State of Cal.
Fair Employment Practice Commission, 170 Cal.Rptr. 887.

17.

Cal. 1973.

Guerrero v. Carleson, 109 Cal.Rptr. 201.

18.

Cal. 1967.

Morris v. Williams, 63 Cal.Rptr. 689.

19.

Cal.App. 2 Dist. 1988.
837.

Salazar v. Honig, 246 Cal.Rptr.

20.

Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1985.
557.

In re John K., 216 Cal.Rptr.

21.

Cal.App. 4 Dist. 1984. Byrnes v. Riles (Capistrano
Unified School Dist.), 204 Cal.Rptr. 100.

22.

Cal.App. 3 Dist. 1983. Nevada County Office of Educ.
v. Superintendent of Public Instruction, 197 Cal.Rptr.
152.

23.

Cal.App. 1982. San Francisco Unified School Dist. v.
State, 182 Cal.Rptr. 585.

24.

Cal. 1971.

Serrano v. Priest, 96 Cal.Rptr. 601.

25.

Cal. 1966.

Manjares v. Newton, 49 Cal.Rptr. 805.

26.

Ca. 1924. Piper v. Big Pine School Dist. of Inyo
County, 193 Cal. 664.
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Medical Services
The EAHCA contains no explicit definition of
"medical services."

In the definition of related services

stated earlier, medical services and counseling are
included, with the stated exception "that such medical
services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes
only" (EAHCA 1980, sec. 1401 (a) (17)).

Such services are

supportive services as may be required to assist a
handicapped child to benefit from special education, and
include the early identification and assessment of
handicapped conditions in children.
The cases that follow are on point regarding the
issues and/or questions posed by the Clovis Unified case.
A District of Columbia public school system appealed
an order to pay for a profoundly schizophrenic child's
medical expenses during her stay at a private psychiatric
hospital.

The mother had asked for special education

placement in the private hospital.

Treatment involved

intensive psychotherapy and a drug program.

A U.S. district

court held that the district did not have to subsidize
medical expenses.

The court found the placement was medical

treatment for her condition and not for rendering educable.
The placement was treatment (McKenzie v. Jefferson 1983,
404).
The parents of a profoundly retarded thirteen-yearold sought a residential placement as opposed to a six-hour-
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a-day program proposed by a Delaware school district.

An

administrative hearing officer ruled for the district, and
the parents' appeal was heard by a

u.s.

district court,

which was moved by testimony that the child needed
consistent full-time residential care in order to stop the
child from experiencing stress and self-destructive
behavior, including continuous vomiting.

The district

court's ruling of inadequate program was affirmed by the
U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit (Kruelle v. New Castle
County School District 1981, 687).
The parents of a severely retarded Massachusetts
child challenged a district on their placement of their
child in a day school training program; the parents wanted
day school and a residential placement.

The Massachusetts

Special Education Appeals Board found for the district's
recommended placement.

The board agreed that a residential

placement was needed but that the child's need for
residential placement was not educationally founded.

u.s.

Court of Appeals, First Circuit, disagreed.

The

The court

concluded that without a residential placement the child not
only would not make educational progress, but might also
regress.

In this case, the court ruled that if a public or

private residential placement including nonmedical care and
room and board was necessary in order to provide educational
services, such services must be provided at no cost to the
parents (Abrahamson v. Hershman 1983, 223).
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In North v. District of Columbia Board of Education,
a U.S. district court held that where a sixteen-year-old
multiple handicapped child's problems were so intertwined
that no single problem could be considered primary, the
school district of the child's residence was responsible for
providing a full-time residential educational program for
him.
The facts of this case are as follows.

The child,

who was epileptic, emotionally disturbed, and learning
disabled, was placed in a private residential treatment
facility in Pennsylvania.

Six months later, the facility

concluded it could no longer deal with the severity of the
boy's emotional and other problems.
alternative placement.

The district offered no

The parents refused twice to accept

the child back in their home, and he was left at the office
of the Department of Human Resources, which referred him to
a public hospital.
Neglect proceedings were initiated against the
parents, who then sought an injunction to compel the
district to place t?e boy in a residential program with
appropriate psychiatric and other services.

The district

offered an educational day program and left the help for the
emotional problems to the parents and/or the Department of
Human Resources.

Both the parents and the Department of

Human Resources disclaimed responsibility.
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The district court held the district liable for the
child's residential care expenses for two reasons.

First,

the EAHCA puts primary responsibility for education with the
state educational agency.

Second, the district court would

not exacerbate the family relationship with the neglect
proceedings.

The district court declined to attempt to

separate the child's social, emotional, medical, and
educational problems in order to identify a primary problem
and affix responsibility to the agency operating in that
area.

Consequently, the use of federal educational laws and

placement pursuant to those laws was the only legally
available alternative {North v. District of Columbia Board
of Education 1979, 136).
In an Illinois case, parents of a handicapped child
appealed a "responsible relative" assessment of $100 per
month for their son's private residence placement.

Before

their appeal could be resolved, their son was given notice
of discharge and the parents filed suit in the U.S. district
court.

The court held that "if the press of time makes

exhaustion of administrative remedies impractical, it is not
required by the EABCA" {Parks v. Pavkovic 1985, 1397).
Eventually, the appellate court ruled for the parents,
observing that federal law assures all handicapped children
the right to a free appropriate public education, and
further, there is a federal law insistence that all expenses
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be borne by the state educational agency (Parks v. Pavkovic
1985, 1397) •
In a 1983 Illinois case, a

u.s.

district court ruled

that state agencies were not required to pay the expenses of
a child with severe behavioral disorders at a psychiatric
hospital.

The parents brought suit against the Illinois

State Board of Education to compel it to pay the costs of
their child's placement at a private residential psychiatric
facility.

The parents argued that the services were

"psychological services," which are included in the
definition of related services under the EAHCA.

The court

rejected this argument, saying that the board had properly
deemed the services psychiatric rather than psychological,
since they were provided by licensed physicians.

Further,

under the EAHCA, all medical services except those provided
for evaluative and diagnostic purposes are specifically
excluded from "related services" (Darlene L. v. Illinois
State Board of Education 1983, 1348).
In a related case, a New Jersey U.S. district court
ruled that a district was required to pay $25,200 for a
child's stay at a day school that provided individualized
psychotherapy, family therapy, group therapy, and individual
and group counseling.

The court held that the psychotherapy

was an integral part of the child's special education
because the psychological services were performed by social

so
workers, school psychologists, nurses, or counselors (T.G.
v. Board of Education 1983, 420).
In 1981, two emotionally disturbed children and
their parents filed a motion before the

u.s.

District Court,

N.D. of California, for a summary judgment against the San
Francisco Unified School District (SFUSD) to compel the
school district to provide funding for residential placement
as ordered by a state hearing officer.
The district had never informed the parents of their
ERA rights for due process, including the fact that under
the EAHCA, the district would be responsible for providing
such funding.

The San Francisco Department of Social

Services (DSS), through juvenile court dependency
proceedings, had provided residential placement for both
Christopher T. and his brother, as advised by the SFUSD.
The district contended that the DSS placements were for
social and behavioral problems, and not educational.
The court found that both brothers required
residential placement in order to benefit from special
education, based on reports and recommendations of
psychologists and psychiatrists before the court.

The court

ordered the SFUSD to assume the cost of residential
placement for both brothers.

Further, the court ordered the

SFUSD to convene new Individual Educational Plans (IEPs) for
both brothers containing residential placement.

The DSS and

the parents were also to be reimbursed for any costs of care
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for their children incurred by them as a result of the
SFUSD's failure to pay for their residential placement
(Christopher T. v. San Francisco Unified School District
1982, 1107).
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts sought a summary
judgment in the U.S. District Court, D. Massachusetts,
against U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services Margaret
Heckler because the Health Care Financing Administration
held that certain services provided to persons residing in
state-owned intermediate care facilities for the mentally
retarded were not eligible for reimbursement under Medicaid.
The district court held that the training being
provided to the individuals came within the category of
habilitative services for which the state was entitled to
reimbursement, even though the training was being provided
by the Commonwealth's Department of Education and Medicaid
does not reimburse the cost of educational activities.
The court concluded that the simple skills being
taught to the institutionalized individuals were not
educational (academic, i.e., reading, writing, math) in the
traditional sense of the word.

Additionally, this case

affirmed the use of joint plans of care that included both
Individual Service Plans (ISPs) and IEPs.

ISPs were

Massachusetts' habilitative training services and IEPs are
EAHCA provisions to provide special education and related
services (Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Heckler 1985, 687).
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A parental placement of a deaf child in a private
school in Ohio in 1986 led the parents to challenge the
refusal of the state and district to provide free
transportation to and from the school.

The

u.s.

court made two important decisions in this case.

district
First, if

transportation is needed for a handicapped child to
participate in special education, the state is required to
provide transportation, even though the services are not
required by the nature of the handicap.

Second, the state

is not required by statute to assume costs of private
education for a handicapped child or costs of services
related to that private education, which has been selected
by the parents for the child for their own personal reasons,
if the state has fulfilled its obligation by making its own
free appropriate public education and related services
available to the handicapped child (James McNair v.
Cardimone 1987, 1361).
The Western District of Pennsylvania U.S. District
Court supported a school district that refused to provide a
full-time nurse for a multiple handicapped child in order
for her to attend school.

The seven-year-old child suffered

multiple handicaps, principally Rabinow syndrome (fetal face
syndrome), severe bronchopulmonary dysplasia, profound
mental retardation, spastic quadriplegia, seizure disorder,
and hydrocephalus.

She was also legally blind.

She

breathed through a tracheostomy tube and was fed and
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medicated through a gastrostomy tube.

The Pittsburgh School

District admitted the girl to a special education program
with the stipulation that the child's parents bear the cost
of the nursing services and equipment the student needed.
The cost of such intensive nursing services was about $1,850
per month; the parents' insurance coverage ceiling was
$500,000 and was soon threatened with depletion.

The

parents' request that the school district assume the
expenses of the nurse who was taking care of the student at
school, and the district's refusal prompted the institution
of administrative due process that led to the district
court's decision.
The court rejected the student's claim that the
nursing services were not medical, that is, performed by a
physician.

Instead, the court ruled that the nursing

services required were so varied, intensive, and costly that
they were more in the nature of medical services than those
included as related services under the EAHCA (Bevin H. v.
Wright 1987, 71).
A Virginia case focused on a parental demand for a
"self-contained" program for a learning disabled child.

The

county school board was ordered to pay for alternative
transportation for the child to attend a "self-contained"
program in a school thirty minutes or more by bus beyond her
regular school of attendance.

This order was considerably
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less than the mother's request to establish a totally new
"self-contained" classroom at her home school.
While the EAHCA intrudes somewhat into the state's
traditional decision-making role in the education of the
handicapped, the act was not intended to totally supplant
the state's prerogative in allocating its financial
resources.

Educational funding is not unlimited.

Balancing

the competing interests of the undeniably important personal
needs of the handicapped child and the realities of limited
funding and the necessity of assisting in the education of
all handicapped children rests as a responsibility with
administrators in the public schools.

A standard of

reasonable accommodat.ion has been recognized; the standard
lies somewhere between the best possible education a school
could provide if it had unlimited funds and access to the
regular classroom without special assistance (Pinkerton v.
Moye 1981, 107).
The Harvard Law Review explained the reimbursement
calculations for educating a handicapped child and the
problems created as follows.

The states (districts) receive

a fixed dollar amount for each handicapped student
irrespective of needs.

Localities therefore have an

incentive to identify handicapped children but not to place
them in an expensive program.

A school system may receive

no more federal money for a child placed in a $20,000 per
year residential program than it does for a child who
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requires $200 worth of special reading instruction in the
regular public school (92 Harv. L.Rev. 1979, 1103,
1109-1110).
After the EAHCA was passed and implemented in 1975,
the judiciary has heard many cases in the state courts, U.S.
district courts, and U.S. courts of appeal, as well as at
the U.S. Supreme Court level.

Two of those cases have

become landmark cases, in that the Supreme Court decisions
became the basis for clarification and interpretation of the
intent of Congress in many disputed individual handicapped
education issues.
The Board of Education v. Rowley decision has served
as a primary citation since the Supreme Court announced its
holdings in 1982.

The Supreme Court established the

following standard for evaluating the appropriateness of a
handicapped child's education: the child's program must be
reasonably calculated to allow the child educational
benefits.

The Supreme Court also acknowledged in Rowley

that the EAHCA was enacted in response to a congressional
concern that millions of handicapped pupils were being
denied a public education, thereby denying them admittance
to public schools or by failure to provide the handicapped
pupils with specialized instruction and related services
once they were admitted.

The court made it clear that the

primary purpose of the EAHCA was to provide access to
education.
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In this instance, the parents of an eight-year-old
child, deaf since birth, claimed that the child was entitled
to have a sign language interpreter in her first-grade
classroom to enable her to have the same educational
opportunity as her classmates.

The Supreme Court found in

the record that the child, an excellent lip reader, was
already provided a special FM electronic hearing aid, that
the child was remarkably well adjusted with her classmates
and teacher, and that she was doing average to above average
academic work.

The parents argued that the interpreter was

needed to allow her to reach her maximum potential, which
would have been in addition to instruction from a tutor for
the deaf one hour each day and from a speech therapist for
three hours each week.

When the school district denied

their request, the parents sought a hearing.

The hearing

officer ruled for the district, as did the New York
commissioner of education.
Pursuant to the provisions of the EAHCA, the parents
sought judicial review in the

u.s.

District Court for the

Southern District of New York, claiming the school district
was, in essence, denying a free appropriate public education
guaranteed by the EAHCA.

The district court found that the

child was doing well, but not learning as much, or
performing as well academically, as she would without her
handicap.

This disparity between the child's achievement

and her potential led the court to decide she was not
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receiving a free appropriate public education.

The court

defined free appropriate as an opportunity to achieve her
full potential commensurate with the opportunity provided to
other children.

The school district's appeal to the

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the

u.s.
u.s.

district court's ruling.
The school district made a final appeal to the

u.s.

Supreme Court, which reversed the two lower courts'
decisions.

The Supreme Court held that the EAHCA is

satisfied when a school provides personalized instruction
with sufficient support services to permit the handicapped
child to benefit educationally.

The court also stated that

the IEP should be reasonably calculated to allow the child
to achieve passing marks and matriculate from grade to
grade.

The court stated that the EHA did not require a

school to provide a sign language interpreter; it further
stated that the EHA is not meant to guarantee a certain
level of education, but merely to open the door of
educational access to handicapped children by means of
special education services.

The court concluded that the

EHA is not required to maximize the potential of each
handicapped child nor provide handicapped children equal
opportunity commensurate with educational opportunities of
nonhandicapped children (Board of Education v. Rowley 1982,
176).
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Where the Rowley decision produced guidelines to
provide access to education for many handicapped children,
the Tatro decision provided four criteria to determine a
school's obligation to provide services that relate to both
the health and education of a handicapped child.
Amber Tatro was a three-and-one-half-year-old child
with "spina bifida," a birth defect which created orthopedic
and speech impairments and a neurogenic bladder condition
that prevented her from being able to empty her bladder
voluntarily.

This latter condition required Clean

Intermittent Catheterization (CIC) to be performed every
three or four hours each day to prevent chronic kidney
infection.

Because of Amber's young age, she could not

perform this service for herself.
The Irving Independent School District in Texas
decided that were Amber to attend its early childhood
development program, the school would not provide
catheterization to Amber during her school day.

Amber's IEP

provided for physical and speech therapy, but failed to
specify that CIC be administered during the school day as a
"related service."

This decision effectively prohibited

Amber from attending the early childhood program.
Amber's parents brought an action before the

u.s.

district court for injunctive relief and monetary damages.
They sued the State of Texas, the State Board of Education,
the Texas Education Agency, the board of trustees for the
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Irving Independent School District, and the district
superintendent.

Their suit alleged that the provision of

catheterization was required by P.L. 94-142, the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29

u.s.c.

5701 et seq., and the

school district's stated policy on treatment of students by
school personnel.
The district court upheld the school district and
ruled that catheterization is a medical, not a related
service.

On the parents' appeal to the

u.s.

Court of

Appeals for the Fifth District, the decision was reversed.
The court of appeals held that CIC is a related service
under the ERA, that the related services qualify as
"supportive services" required to assist a handicapped child
to benefit from special education, and that the supportive
services are no less related to the effort to educate the
child than are services that enable a child to reach, enter,
or exit a school.
In July 1984, the

u.s.

Supreme Court ruled on the

Irving Independent School District appeal and affirmed the
court of appeals' holdings.

The Supreme Court stated that

CIC was a "related service" under the EHA, as without it,
Amber would not be able to attend school at all (Irving
Independent School District v. Tatro 1984, 3371).
The court listed four criteria to determine a
school's obligation to provide services that relate to both
the health and education of a child.

First, the child must
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be handicapped so as to require special education; the child

is then entitled to related services.

Second, only those

services necessary to aid a handicapped child to benefit
from special education must be provided.

Third, ERA

regulations state that school nursing services must be
performed by a nurse or other qualified person, not by a
physician.

Fourth, only services can be provided, not the

equipment required to perform those services.
Both the Rowley and Tatro decisions and the other
pertinent cases reviewed in this chapter serve as a
foundation for the analysis of the findings of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit regarding Clovis
Unified's claim that Michelle S.'s placement in an acute
psychiatric care hospital, as a related service, was not
what Congress intended in the ERA as an appropriate special
education placement.
A girl, Katherine D., was in private school in
Hawaii; she suffered from cystic fibrosis and
tracheomalacia.

Her mother attended to her in the private

school to provide suctioning and clearing processes.

The

Hawaiian Department of Education certified Katherine D. as

eligible for special education services.
The girl's school district proposed a homebound
program because of the unavailability in the public schools
of medical services that the girl required.

The parents
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rejected the IEP and continued in the private educational
setting.
The following year, the district proposed a public
school program conducted by staff members the district would
train to meet the child's medical needs.

The parents also

rejected this proposal, continued private school education,
and brought suit to compel the district to pay for both
years of private education.

A U.S. district court in Hawaii

held in favor of the parents, and the school district
appealed.
The U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, held that
the homebound program was inappropriate and, because the
district was unable to offer an appropriate public school
program, the district was required to pay the private
education costs for the first year.

However, the

alternative program conducted by trained district staff
members was ruled appropriate; thus, the parents were not
entitled to tuition reimbursement for the second year
(Katherine D. v. Hawaii Department of Education 1983, 809).
Parents or guardians of disabled children who
unilaterally change the placement of their child during any
review proceedings often seek reimbursement from their
school district for private school tuition expenses.

A

Massachusetts case ruled upon by the U.S. Supreme Court
stated that parents who violate the "status quo" provisions
may nevertheless receive private tuition reimbursement from
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the school district if the IEP proposed by the district is
later found to be inappropriate.

However, if the proposed

IEP is found to be appropriate, the parents will not be
entitled to reimbursement for expenses incurred in
unilaterally changing their child's placement.
The Supreme Court also observed that to bar
reimbursement claims under all circumstances of unilateral
placement would violate the EAHCA, which favors proper
interim placements for handicapped children.

Further, the

court stated that parents should not be forced neither to
leave their child in what might be found later to be an
inappropriate educational placement, nor to obtain an
appropriate placement only by sacrificing any claim for
reimbursement.

Finally, the court said their decision did

have an impact on parents, that is, parents who unilaterally
change placement during the pendency of proceedings do so at
their own financial risk (Burlington School Committee v.
Department of Education of Massachusetts 1985, 1996).
In a 1982 New York case, an emotionally disturbed
twenty-year-old was educationally placed in a state-approved
health care facility.

When the state decertified the

institution, giving it a hospital descriptor instead of a
school descriptor, the twenty-year-old stayed for some time
after the state declared it was no longer obligated to pay
the $185 per day cost for the youth's maintenance because
the institution was now a hospital, not a school.
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The parents sued for costs until an alternative
placement could be determined.

The district court ruled

that the state was obligated to continue to pay.

Both sides

used the "status quo" argument, and the state appealed.

The

U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, affirmed the district
court's decision by ruling that the state could not disclaim
its statutory obligation by decertifying an institution.

A

free appropriate public education in a suitable institution
remains the responsibility of the state (Vander Malle v.
Ambach 1982, 49).
A 1988 California case illustrated that when
residential placement is necessary to provide a handicapped
child with a free appropriate public education, then
residential placement is a "related service" under the EHA.
In this instance, a child suffered with mental retardation
and infantile autism.

The Regional Center for the East Bay

(RCEB), a nonprofit community agency operating under the
Welfare and Institutions Code, provided services to the
child by placing him in a licensed community care facility,
the Behavior Research Institute of California (BRI).

A

local school paid the student's educational costs.
When the child's self-abusive behavior became
severe, the RCEB terminated funding and placement at the
BRI.

The parents sought a temporary restraining order and

then a preliminary injunction to stop the change in
placement.

Since there was no evidence that the placement
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at the BRI was for educational reasons, the

u.s.

district

court ruled that the RCEB was not subject to ERA "status
quo" standards, and the parents' suit was declined.
Subsequent reconsideration by the same court vacated
its previous denial, and the parents prevailed, because the
IEP team and the RCEB jointly recommended placement at the
BRI in order to provide the student with a free appropriate
public education (Corbett v. Regional Center for the East
Bay 1988, 230).
An

Illinois school district was sued by the parents

of a high school freshman who had been placed in a special
education program.

The district's Department of Special

Education recommended outside extensive psychotherapy.

An

IEP that did not include psychotherapy was developed without
parental participation.

The student's condition worsened;

however, the school district later issued the student a
diploma.
The parents' suit sought revocation of the diploma,
remedial education in a private residential facility,
reimbursement for costs in providing services to their child
under his independently prepared IEP, and $1 million in
general damages for alleged violations of the ERA.

The U.S.

district court ruled against the parents, citing Illinois
law which required that the state provide tuition-free
education but did not stipulate that the state was required
to provide psychotherapy.

The court held further that
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general monetary damages were not available under the ERA.
The revocation of the diploma was also denied since it made
no sense to revoke the diploma if the state was not required
to provide the educational placement the parents sought (Max
M. v. Thompson 1983, 1330).
Hospital care has been understood by Congress and
the secretary of education to be a far more expensive
proposition than is educational residential placement, and a
greater burden than the states could ordinarily be expected
to shoulder in their budgets for education.
The fact that Congress failed to include
hospitalization explicitly as a related service or placement
under the EAHCA is supported by the U.S. Supreme Court in
its writings in Pennhurst State School v. Halderman: "If
Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of
federal monies, it must do so unambiguously" (Pennhurst
State School v. Halderman 1982, 17).
In a Massachusetts case, a

u.s.

district court ruled

that it (the court) was not free to substitute its own
standards for educational programs for those of the state
when they held that a school district was not financially
responsible for placement in a psychiatric hospital, as the
institution was not a state-approved special education
facility (Doe v. Anrig 1987, 430).
In two other cases, the courts ordered school
districts to pay for residential placements that provided
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integrated programs of educational and other supportive
services and fell under the purview of the EAHCA (Clevenger
v. Oak Ridge School Board 1984, 514; Jefferson County Board
of Education v. Breen 1988, 853-57).

In the Breen case, the

court expressly refused to place a child in a psychiatric
hospital.

CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In 1989, Zirkel found that the spurt of litigation
in the 1970s, after the implementation of P.L. 94-142, was
beginning to slow down, with the marked exception of special
education.

He found that a conservative judiciary was

slowly closing the door on plaintiffs--the students, the
parents, the staff, and other citizens who sue school
districts.

Additionally, Zirkel pointed out that more than

55 percent of the U.S. Supreme Court's K-12 education
decisions during the current decade (the 1980s) had favored
school authorities, up from only 30 percent during the
1970s.

He stated, "If the '70s were the heyday for people

suing the schools, then, the '80s are shaping up as the naydays--with the exception, that is, of special education"
(Zirkel 1989, 21).
In the case study chosen as the focal point of the
current study--Clovis Unified School District (Plaintiff) v.
California Office of Administrative Hearings, California
State Superintendent of Public Instruction, and California
Department of Education (Defendants), Michelle S., Real
Party in Interest--the school district and the child's
parents appealed a

u.s.

district court judgment.
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The appeal
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was submitted to the

u.s.

Circuit in San Francisco.

Court of Appeals for the Ninth
The district appealed for a new

trial and amended findings of fact and conclusion at the
U.S. district court level.

The parents of Michelle S.

fought the state of California defendants, seeking the
overturning of the Office of Administrative Hearings'
rulings and for an extended placement.

Further, the parents

also sought attorney's fees.
Analysis
The Clovis Unified School District contended the
district court's ruling exceeded the requirements of the
EAHCA by requiring a public education agency to pay for
medical costs.

The district argued, further, that the

district court ignored pertinent state policies, procedures,
and laws that the state had developed to ensure a free
appropriate education for all handicapped pupils within its
jurisdiction, and that the rulings placed an unwarranted
obligation on the state or school that Congress could not
have intended.
Educational Funding
The EAHCA of 1975 is an educational funding statute
enacted pursuant to Congress's spending powers and is
designed to assist state and local educational agencies in
regulating education for handicapped children.

To qualify

for federal assistance for special education programs, a
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state must have in effect a policy that assures all
handicapped children of receiving a "free appropriate
education."

The state must adopt policies and procedures

that assure all children of receiving an appropriate
education, regardless of the severity of their handicap.
The EAHCA was enacted in response to congressional
concern that millions of handicapped children were being
denied a public education, either by denying them admittance
to public schools or by failure to provide the handicapped
pupils with specialized instruction and related services
once they were admitted.
In the Rowley decision, the

u.s.

Supreme Court

explained the act as Congress's providing access or
availability for all handicapped children.

The court

further explained that Congress did not impose on the states
any greater substantive educational standard than would be
necessary to make such access meaningful.

In fact, the

court explained that the process of providing special
education and related services to handicapped children is
not guaranteed to produce any particular outcomes.

Thus,

the act was meant more to open the door of public education
to handicapped children on appropriate terms (related
services) than to guarantee any particular level of
education, once they were inside.
The state of California had the required policy; it
had a state master plan approved by the secretary of
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education.

The plan contained goals, timetables, and

service priorities to meet the needs of the unserved and
inadequately served handicapped pupils.

The state plan met

the numerous procedural requirements of the EAHCA, i.e.,
Individualized Educational Program (IEP) evaluations, parent
notice and consent, and processes for questioning local
educational agency decisions through administrative
hearings.
Significantly, Congress entrusted the development of
the IEP to those with substantive knowledge, that is, a
representative of the local educational agency, the teacher,
and the parent.

The content of the IEP and its

implementation were left to the discretion of the educators
and parents within the states.
If conflicts or disagreements did occur, Congress
designed a dispute resolution procedure, the first step of
which was an administrative hearing conducted by an
independent hearing officer.

The hearing officer was not to

be an employee of the state or local educational agency.
The hearing officer's decision was to be final unless
appealed to a court of competent jurisdiction.
The second step could then include an appeal to a
court of competent jurisdiction.

On appeal, the court is to

review the administrative record, hear additional evidence
at the request of a party, and basing its decision on the
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preponderance of evidence, grant such relief as it
determines appropriate.
According to the Supreme Court Rowley rulings, such
a court's inquiry is twofold.
First has the state complied with the procedures in the
EABCA and secondly, is the IEP developed through the
procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to
receive educational benefits. If these requirements are
met, the state has complied with the obligations implied
by Congress and the courts can require no more (Board of
Education v. Rowley 1982, 206-207).
It can be argued that the administrative hearing
officer and the U.S. district court failed to recognize the
state of California's approved plan and the district's
compliance by making Clovis Unified financially responsible
for Michelle's placement in a psychiatric hospital.

First,

state law and policy, which do not authorize hospitalization
as a residential placement, are consistent with the EAHCA,
which requires only that instruction be provided in
hospitals.

Clovis Unified was already compensating Kings

Canyon Unified for the educational services being provided
to Michelle S. while at Kings View Center, an acute care
psychiatric hospital.
The district court erred legally in describing the
hospitalization incumbent services and costs in such a
residential placement by finding the services as "related
services" as defined in the EAHCA.

By finding that Kings

View Center provided both related services and residential
care, the district court ended up ordering the district to
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pay for medical treatment, not education.

In this instance,

the district had offered a program, Re-Ed West in
Sacramento, which was a state-recognized educational
residential school, for approximately $50,000 per year.
This program authorized by state law was sufficient to
confer educational benefits on Michelle.
The contrast was that a 365-day hospital placement
at Kings View Center was going to cost approximately
$150,000 per year for medical and pastoral services, not
education.

Table 3 presents the rate and percentage

distributions per day for Michelle's placement at Kings
View.
The Kruelle decision contained the need for
education in many nonacademic forms, but in general,
education for the handicapped child should not be stretched
to cover the medical needs of handicapped pupils.

Michelle

S. had been consistently improving in her special day school
education prior to her unilateral placement by her parents

in Kings View.

The rationale for the Kings View placement

was that she was unmanageable at home and periodically at
school; Michelle was placed at Kings View for medical
reasons, not educational.

To include extended psychiatric

hospitalization within the related services or special
education placement options outlined in the EABCA strained
logic and educational expertise, as well as educational
resources.

Considering Michelle's age at the time of the
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Table 3.

Kings View Center, Tioga Ward: Daily Rate and
Percentage Distribution Summary for Fiscal Year
1985-86

Services

Percentage
Distribution

Dollar
Distribution

Direct Services
Ward Nursing Coverage
Nursing Administration
Nursing Inservice Training
Ancillary Services
Lab and Radiology
Psychological Testing
Pharmacy
Activity Therapy
Vocational Rehabilitation
Therapy--Non/M.D.
Support Services
Discharge Planning
Dietary
Laundry and Linen
Housekeeping
Maintenance and
Plant Operations
Grounds
Medical Records
Administrative Services
General Administration
Admitting
Community Information and
Education
Chaplaincy Services
Corporation Service
Totals
Professional Fees
Total Dollars

29.05
1.02
1.06

$ 104.58
3.67
3.82

1.21
.28
3.10
7.46
.82
9.04

4.36
1.01
11.16
26.86
2.95
32.55

.79
5.05
.32
3.05

2.84
18.18
1.15
10.98

11.98
1.14
.94

43.13
4.10
3.38

9.91
.99

35.68
3.56

1.69
1.64
9.46

6.08
5.90
34.06

100.00

360.00
60.00
$ 420.00
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appeal, ten, and considering her prevailing on her appeal
for continued placement until she reached the special
education age of majority, twenty-two, the district could
have been responsible for nearly $2 million for the cost of
this one child's hospital/educational expenses.
Related Services
Related services, by definition, are services that
have a connection to a child's special educational needs.
Related services are not defined as services to cure or
treat a handicapped pupil's disability or illness, but as
"such services as may be required to assist a handicapped
child to benefit from special education" (Education for All
Handicapped Children Act 1980, sec. 1401 (a) (17)).
Congress was careful in its EAHCA definition to
specifically exclude "medical and counseling services,
except that such medical services shall be for diagnostic
and evaluation purposes only" (EAHCA 1980, sec. 1401 (a)
(17)).

The totality of the EAHCA was educational in nature

and in focus.

A reading of the entire EABCA makes it clear

that Congress intended to provide education to handicapped
pupils, not to solve the social, medical, vocational,
housing, or transportation problems that are generally
associated with disabled persons.
The terms "education" and "instruction" are defined
and used repeatedly throughout the statute to describe the
state's responsibilities to handicapped pupils.

The term
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"medical services" is included only once, as mentioned
above, to exclude all medical services except those which
are necessary for diagnosis and evaluation.
The legislative history also speaks of "instruction"
and "education" and passes over the medical exclusion as
though Congress's intent needs no further interpretation.
Both the legislative history and the Rowley decision make it
clear that in developing the EAHCA, Congress relied heavily
upon two right-to-education cases for handicapped pupils:
Mills v. Board of Education of the District of Columbia and
Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children CPARCl v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Although children in the PARC

case were hospitalized, there was no order that schools pay
for the hospitalization, but simply that the children be
provided access to special education.

Congress expected the

interpretation of medical services to be relatively
straightforward, based on the usual understanding of the
distinction between medical treatment and education.

The

fact that Congress failed to explicitly include
hospitalization as a service or placement precludes the
imposition of such a burden by the courts.
The legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the
spending power thus rests on whether the states
voluntarily and knowingly accept the terms of its
"contract" with the federal government. Accordingly, if
Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of
federal monies, it must do so unambiguously (Pennhurst
State School v. Halderman 1982, 17).
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Congress had a clear understanding of special
education and the related services based on the existing
educational programs being provided by most states in 1974.
The list of related services provided by Congress in Section
1401 (a) (12) of the EABCA were services that were already
being provided in most states.

The problem for Congress was

not designing new and unheard of educational interventions,
but rather, making the existing programs and services
available to all handicapped pupils who had such a need.
The

u.s.

Supreme Court understood this historical

context in which Congress operated when it decided the case
of Irving Independent School District v. Tatro.

After

deciding that intermittent catheterization was a related
service that required little, if any, specialized medical
knowledge to administer, the Supreme Court concluded that
school nurses could perform the catheterization.
School nurses have long been a part of the educational
system, and the Secretary would therefore reasonably
conclude that school nursing services are not the sort
of burden that Congress intended to exclude as a
"medical service." By limiting the "medical services"
exclusion to the services of a physician or hospital,
both far more expensive, the Secretary has given a
permissible construction to the provision (Irving
Independent School District v. Tatro 1984, 3378).
Unlike Tatro, the psychiatric hospitalization of
Michelle

s.

was not a long-established part of the

educational system.

The psychological and psychiatric

services provided by Kings View Center differed with the
definition of related services found in the EAHCA.

Such
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services are explicitly included within the related services
and have long been a part of the California educational
system, i.e., counseling and diagnosing.

However, intensive

extended treatment in a psychiatric hospital has never been
a part of education in California.

The treatment provided

in such facilities exceeds the expertise of state and local
educational agencies and clearly falls within the medical
exclusion addressed in Tatro.
Residential Placement
Versus Hospitalization
Clovis Unified had, in essence, stipulated that a
residential placement was necessary in the case of Michelle
S.

The district did dispute that a psychiatric hospital was

a residential placement.

The requirement for residential

placement is imposed by the EAHCA without explanation in
Section 1401 (a) (9).

The legislative history is clear that

Congress included room and board within the meaning of a
free appropriate education.

California included residential

placement as an educational expense for handicapped pupils.
Paying for the costs of a hospital placement for Michelle

s.

was disputed because the district believed that residential
placement payments arose only when the placement was for the
purpose of providing education.

The federal regulations

supported this belief:
If placement in a public or private residential program
is necessary to provide special education and related
services to a handicapped child, the program, including
non-medical care and room and board, must be at no cost
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to the parents of the child. C.F.R. comment: This
requirement applies to placements which are made by
public agencies for educational purposes (Code of
Federal Regulations, sec. 300.302).
Handicapped children are placed out of home for a
variety of reasons and upon the recommendation of a variety
of agencies and professionals.

Some are placed in group or

foster homes, some are institutionalized, and some are
hospitalized upon the recommendation of medical personnel
for treatment of mental or physical illness.

Others can be

placed, by IEP teams, in residential schools/facilities
offering intensive programs, when only those programs will
enable the handicapped pupil to benefit educationally.

It

is only this latter placement category that Congress
intended under the EABCA.
In Abrahamson v. Hirshman (1983), the First Circuit
Court of Appeals stated:
This is not to say that the Act requires a local school
committee (district) to support a handicapped child in a
residential program simply to remedy a poor home setting
or to make up for some other deficit not covered by the
Act. It is not the responsibility of local officials
under the Act to finance foster care as such; other
resources must be looked to. In passing the Act,
Congress intended to remedy the fact that educational
systems often failed to provide programs for handicapped
children • • • Congress did not intend to burden local
school committees (districts) with providing all social
services to all handicapped children (227-28).
Numerous courts have recognized that when faced with
the question of appropriate residential placement under the
EABCA, the court is obligated to look at the purpose of such
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a placement.

In Kruelle, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals

made the following statement:
Analysis must focus, then, on whether full time
placement may be considered for educational purposes, or
whether the residential placement is a response to
medical, social or emotional problems that are
segregable from the learning process. One of the early
cases actually collapsed the distinction by declaring
the impossibility of separating emotional and
educational needs in complex cases. However, as later
cases demonstrate, the claimed inextricability of
medical and educational grounds for certain services
does not signal court abdication from decison making in
difficult matters (Kruelle v. New Castle County School
District 1981, 693).
The cases of Kruelle, North, and Christopher T.
speak to the segregable issues in Michelle S.'s case.

Each

of these cases proposes that when a child's needs are so
intertwined as to be inseverable, education cannot be
relieved of the obligation by pointing to another need.

In

Michelle S.'s case, her needs were so intertwined that
residential placement was necessary.

As to her need for

psychiatric hospitalization, the issues are distinguishable.
Once Michelle was identified as needing the services of a
hospital, her medical needs surmounted her educational needs
and were therefore severable.

In Parks v. Pavkovic, the

Seventh Circuit District Court contended that whenever a
severely emotionally disturbed child needs residential
placement, it is not always for other than educational
reasons.

That court also held that when he/she needs to be

hospitalized, it is always for medical, not educational
reasons.
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When Michelle

s. was unilaterally placed

in Kings

View, it was for a medical crisis; her needs were clearly
severable from her educational needs.

Because she had an

acute need for medical intervention, she was unable to be
placed in a residential school.

Her needs for medical

treatment surmounted her need for an education.

Since her

hospitalization was not for the purpose of education, the
U.S. district court had erred when it determined that
hospitalization was a residential placement for which Clovis
Unified was responsible under the EAHCA.
There are two cases on point regarding a reviewing
court's role in determining whether school districts are
responsible for residential placements in psychiatric
hospitals.

The reviewing court must look at the primary

purpose of the contested service or placement to determine
whether it is educational within the meaning of the EAHCA.
In both Darlene L. and McKenzie v. Jefferson, the court
reviewed the purpose of hospitalization and concluded that
Congress did not intend that public education agencies enter
the field of psychiatric hospitalization by recognizing that
pupils are not placed in such facilities for educational
reasons.
Costs
When the

u.s.

district court failed to hear

testimony on the costs or to consider such costs of the
hospital placement of Michelle, the court also failed to
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consider the costs to the states for providing medical
services as indicators of Congress's intent to exclude such
services from the EAHCA.
The

u.s.

Supreme Court had implicitly noted in Tatro

that cost could be indicative of congressional intent:
This definition of "medical services" is a reasonable
interpretation of Congressional intent. The Secretary
could reasonably conclude that it was designed to spare
schools from an obligation to provide a service that
might well prove unduly expensive and beyond the range
of their competence. By limiting the "medical services"
exclusion to the services of a physician or hospital,
both far more expensive, the Secretary has given a
permissible construction to the provision (Irving
Independent School District v. Tatro 1984, 3371).
The excluded testimony in the Michelle

s.

case could

have demonstrated that the services the district was being
required to pay for at Kings View Hospital were services of
a medical nature, provided by persons who traditionally have
not been employed by the public schools, and for services
for which educators have neither expertise nor training.

It

was not a simple complaint of high costs for
hospitalization, but rather, that the high costs were
indicative that Congress did not intend to place
hospitalization costs upon the public school system.
Numerous other courts have recognized that even the
EAHCA, with its promise of a free appropriate public
education for all handicapped children, does not require
excessive spending on one handicapped child at the expense
of others.

The cost differential of $100,000 between the

two placements found appropriate by the Michelle S. state
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hearing officer should have been heard in the context of
costs and appropriate placement decisions.

The cases of

Katherine D., Roncker, Stacy G., Darlene L., Age, and
Takarick all apply.
Sectarian Status
At a trial in the U.S. district court, Clovis
Unified's motion to amend its pleadings and to offer
testimony on the issue of Kings View's affiliation with the
Mennonite Church and subsequent decertification by the state
of California was denied.

The federal regulations governing

the use of federal grant monies for education, including
funds generated through the EAHCA, specifically prohibit the
use of such funds for religious purposes (Code of Federal
Regulations, sec. 76.352).

Additionally, the U.S.

Constitution frequently has been interpreted as precluding
the use of federal funds in institutions that are
pervasively sectarian, where excessive entanglement of
church and state might occur.

There exist numerous case law

references that may have had a bearing on Clovis Unified's
case.
Conclusions
The first conclusion that can be drawn from this
study relates to the time it takes to implement the due
process procedures provided by the EAHCA.

In July 1985, the

parents of Michelle S. notified Clovis Unified that they
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wanted the district to pay for Michelle's residential
placement costs in Kings View Hospital.

The course of

administrative hearings led to an order from the hearing
officer that Michelle was to be placed at Kings View for the
1985-86 school year.
In September 1985, the district filed for a
temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction.
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
California denied both motions and set a trial date for
October 1985.

That date was postponed until March 1986.

The trial was eventually held, and in June-July 1986, the
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law were entered into
the record, as was a judgment for Michelle.
Clovis Unified then filed an appeal with the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals.

The appeal was submitted and

argued originally in August 1987.

The submission was

vacated by the appeals court in April 1988, while the
district, the state superintendent of instruction, and the
State Department of Education prepared a joint appeal.

The

appeal was resubmitted in March 1990, with a final ruling
filed in May 1990.

The exhaustion of all due process

procedures for both the district and Michelle's parents took
nearly five years to resolve.
The second conclusion that can be drawn is that
pursuit of resolution of difficult issues involving
handicapped children's educational placement and related

84
services by means of legal counsel and the judicial system

is a very costly venture.

In the case of Clovis Unified,

the retention of counsel throughout the administrative
hearings and throughout the trial in the u.s. district court
resulted in legal fees that easily exceeded $200,000.
Coupled with this conclusion is that Michelle s.•s
parents cross-appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
for the payment by the district of their attorney's fees
pursuant to the u.s. district court's order of December 8,
1986.

It must be noted that when the issue first went to

trial in October 1985, attorney's fees were not provided for
by the EAHCA.

With the passage of the Handicapped

Children's Protection Act (HCPA) of 1986, Congress expressly
provided that attorney's fees that were pending on or after
July 4, 1984 be paid to a prevailing parent or guardian.
As stated under the limitations of this study,
conclusions can be made regarding the questions put forward
to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

The tribunal

provided the following legal conclusions.
School districts need not fund hospitalization for
such children as Michelle S.

The court of appeals explained

as follows:
It stands to reason that the high cost of her placement
is due to the status of Kings View as a medical
facility, requiring a staff of licensed physicians, a
high staff to patient ratio, and other services which
would not be available or required at a placement in an
educational institution. While the cost of medical and
hospital services are not dispositive, the Supreme Court
in Tatro noted that the Secretary of Education, in
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promulgating regulations, excluded "the services of
physician or hospital," partly because such services are
"far more expensive" than the services, for example, of
a school nurse. Clearly hospital care is, and was
understood by Congress and the Secretary of Education to
be, a far more expensive proposition than is educational
residential placement and a greater burden than the
states could ordinarily be expected to shoulder in their
budgets for education. We, too, recognize the
unfairness of requiring school districts to pay for
hospitalization on the basis of broad interpretations of
ambiguous language in funding statutes such as the EAHCA
(Clovis Unified School District--Appellant v. California
Office of Administrative Hearings, Michelle S., Real
Party in Interest--Appellee 1990, 4811).
With this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the

u.s.

district court's and the

administrative hearing officer's order that Clovis Unified
had to pay for the hospitalization of Michelle S. during the
1985-86 school year.

The court also in effect denied

Michelle S.'s appeal for attorney's fees because the reverse
order indicated that the family was not a prevailing party
and therefore not entitled to attorney's fees under the
EAHCA, sec. 1415 (e)

(4).

Finally, the Ninth Circuit endorsed the California
Master Plan for Special Education by indicating that an
appropriate special education delivery system and acceptable
standards for educating handicapped children in nonpublic
residential facilities does exist.
Recommendations
As the issues of appropriate educational residential
placements and the medical services exclusion under the
EAHCA were analyzed and resolved in the Michelle S. case,
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another layer of clarity about Congress's intent in putting
the act into being has come into the voluminous body of case
law regarding the implementation of the act.

However, the

factor of time to effect due process, the factor of costs in
carrying out due process, and the factor of ever-increasing
special education demands on public school financial
resources continue to exist and, in fact, increase.
A theme that recurred consistently in the research
of the legal literature was that a badly needed piece of
national legislation, the EAHCA, possibly needs to be
reexamined, especially in view of the ever-increasing
litigation being experienced in implementing the EAHCA.

The

same is true of the state's debate over how best to allocate
its financial resources in order to accommodate all
handicapped children.
While the EAHCA intrudes somewhat into the state's
traditional decision-making role in the education of the
handicapped, the act was not intended to totally supplant
the state's prerogative in allocating its financial
resources.

Educational funding is not unlimited.

Competing

interests must be balanced to reach a reasonable
accommodation.

On the one hand are the important personal

needs of the individual handicapped child, and on the other,
the realities of limited funding and the necessity of
assisting in the education of all handicapped children.
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Paul Goldfinger, in his article, "Special Education:
Too Many Mandates, Too Little Funding--A Formula for
Disaster," goes a bit further, in stating that the balance
also effects the nonhandicapped child:
Something is out of balance • • • what was initially
hailed as a major step for the equal protection of
students with disabilities is now seen by many as giving
over-protection to this one class of students
(Goldfinger 1995, 5).
Goldfinger points out that under the EAHCA (IDEA), a
guarantee of a free appropriate education gives special
education first call on a school agency's revenues.

This

guarantee in combination with some special education abuses
is causing conflicts with general education.

Such conflicts

are depicted as special education costs which ultimately
come from revenues meant for other students, an encroachment
on a district's general funds.
The bottom line, according to Goldfinger, is that
special education students have rights and privileges beyond
those available to general education pupils.

It is

appropriate that all students receive the services they need
to benefit from their education.

However, due to limited

financial resources and the ability of one segment of the
school population to have first call on those resources
means that the balance of the school population is not
equally served.
One of the balances potentially forthcoming, but not
recommended, is a series of reverse discrimination suits
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originating from the violation of rights of nondisabled
pupils.

This could be the next litigation explosion; and

one that proponents of the EAHCA and proponents for a
guaranteed FAPE for nondisabled students should avoid.
Other directions that are recommended for future
research, review, and/or reform are as follows:
1.

California's hearing officer system needs to be

examined critically to ensure that hearing officers have
appropriate standards for comparison of assessments of a
pupil's need by parents and nonpublic school advocates, and
assessments performed by local education agencies.

These

standards, assessment comparisons, and the hearing officers
who implement them need to be more fair.
2.

California should use new federal funds as an

augmentation for special education, instead of reducing
state support for special education.

By doing so, the

federal government would receive a benefit for providing a
higher level of funding for special education.

Further,

such a move would provide incentive for California special
education advocates to seek a higher level of federal
funding.
3.
education.

California needs to fully fund growth in special
In 1994-95, only 49 percent of the statutory

entitlement for special education was funded.

This means

that only about half of the growth of pupils enrolled in
special education was funded.
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4.

California and the federal government need to

establish a standard that special education pupils are
guaranteed in their FAPE that is comparable to that for
general education pupils.
5.

California and the federal government need to

clarify the local education agency placement requirements
related to the "least restrictive environment," especially
when dealing with the new emphasis on "total inclusion" and
placement in nonpublic, nonsectarian schools.
6.

California and the federal government need to

restrict attorney's fees, so that the cost of such fees do
not override sound educational decisions.

Two ways this

could be implemented are (1) prohibit the payment of fees
for any attorney involvement in the development of
individualized education program (IEP), which would make
this process more nonadversarial, and (2) provide attorney's
fees only proportionate to the percentage of issues on which
the attorney prevailed.
7.

The California and federal governments need to

fulfill their promises when the EAHCA was enacted that a 40
percent funding level be maintained, or the state and
federal mandates are to be reduced.
8.

The California and federal governments need to

require that noneducational services be provided by
noneducational agencies.

Specifically, local health

agencies should be required to provide occupational and
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physical therapy and other health services.

Mental health

agencies should provide mental health services under the
same due process requirements existent for educational
agencies.

CHAPTER V
PROPOSED SPECIAL EDUCATION SERVICES
DELIVERY SYSTEM
Introduction
The case study detailed in Chapters I through IV
leads to· a call for educational leadership to develop better
implementation provisions of Public Law 94-142.

The strict

adherence to the definitions and procedures contained in the
federal law in conjunction with the expansive California
Special Education Master Plan and enormous body of judicial
decisions on special education has led to a loss of trust
for educators, in general, which disturbingly includes a
growing mistrust of Special Education Local Plan Area
(SELPA) personnel, extending even to the special education
classroom instructors.

This loss of trust and resultant

adversarial role of educators with their clients, special
education students, and the students' parents needs to be
reversed.
Such a reversal needs to lead to new attitudes and
roles for school site administrators, district SELPA
administrators, and all classroom instructors, regular and
special education.

The purpose of this chapter, then,

~s

propose a special education services delivery system that
will reestablish the role of school site administrators,
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to
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district office personnel, and all classroom teachers as
client supporters and advocates not only for special
education students, but for all students served by public
educators.
General Philosophy
Educators, in general, have lost their focus and,
thereby, their purpose in providing aggressive leadership
and equitable access to education for handicapped children.
A social philosophy underlying the delivery of special
education services needs to be rearticulated.

The founding

documents of the nation stress the proposition that all men
are created equal.

Time and time again, this statement has

been interpreted to mean that all men are equally human.
All other rights are derived from this humanness, including
the right of access to education.

This right is not

dependent on a level of intelligence, a degree of physical
perfection, or a standard of emotional stability.
Therefore, each child has a right of access to education
regardless of level of intelligence or physical or emotional
disabilities.

Various courts and educational institutions

have acted over the years to define and redefine what is
reasonable in providing this access.

Certainly in the cited

case in this study and in many other cases, consideration of
the fiscal impact of providing this equal access to
education is allowed; however, the philosophy behind Public
Law 94-142 needs to be reasserted.

Congress, representing
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society, looks to the leaders of schools to seek out,
identify, and guarantee a free, appropriate public education
to every handicapped child under a clearly defined system of
due process.

This is, then, the articulated philosophy and

the focused role of educators in the proposed special
education delivery system that follows.
Goal Sharing
Clovis Unified School District has initiated a new
interactive leadership system called Goal Sharing.

One of

the foundational premises of Goal Sharing addresses the need
to reestablish trust between educators and the clients they
serve.
For too long, educators have told their clients, the
district's parents and taxpayers, what an education is.

For

too long, educators have devised education's policies,
practices, and procedures without the input of their
clients.

Educators have decided both the .. what .. and "how ..

of education, with little, if any, input from their client
constituency.

When the definition of education or the

processes of education have been questioned, for too long,
educators have responded defensively or adversarially with
their clients.

Goal Sharing provides a proactive,

collaborative inclusion of all clients in the district's
educational decision-making process.

The Goal Sharing model

currently consists of seven advisory councils, whose
membership is a broad-based collection of students, parents,
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clergy, chamber of commerce representatives, business
leaders, educational leaders, teachers, civic leaders,
employees of the district, and members of the governing
board.

Each council's primary purpose is to survey and poll

all the district's clients as to what the attributes of a
quality education are.

The councils also review district

policies, practices, and procedures in order to recommend to
the governing board and administration, systemic changes and
improvements.

The educational products and services desired

by the clients of the district will hopefully improve
through this community collaborative effort.

The councils

are formed to focus on the functions suggested by their
respective titles, i.e., the Accountability, Student
Standards/Community Support, Administrative Services,
Cognitive Domain--Mind, Psychomotor Domain--Body, Affective
Domain--Spirit, and Communications Councils.
Goal Sharing: Special Education
Advisory Council
The proposed special education delivery model starts
by creating an additional district council in the Goal
Sharing paradigm:
The Special Education Council shall consist of at
least the following: a representative from the district's
child development program (preschool age), a parent from the
child development program, a special education parent from
each educational level (K-6, 7-8, 9-12), a special education
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teacher from each educational level (K-6, 7-8, 9-12), the
district SELPA administrator, a district psychologist, a
regular education teacher from each educational level (K-6,
7-8, 9-12), a regular education parent from each educational
level (K-6, 7-8, 9-12), a principal from each educational
level (K-6, 7-8, 9-12), a clergyman, a local university
representative, a civic leader, a business person, a member
of the judiciary, a member of the bar, representatives from
various special education advocacy groups, general
representatives from the community at large, and
representatives from the medical professions (doctors and/or
nurses).
Goals: Goal Sharing Special
Education Council
The goal for the Special Education Council is to
proactively and collaboratively include the district's
clients in determining what quality special education
programs are and to provide client input into how to effect
equitable access to education for all handicapped children.
The processes that have been most successful for the
implementation of the Goal Sharing model are described below
as process objectives.
I.

Determine what special education is currently (staff,
services, funding, facilities, history, law).
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II.

Inform all clients (all parents, regular and special
education; all staff, regular and special education;
the total community) about current services.

III.

Poll all clients as to what special education should
be in the district.

IV.

Prioritize input and establish short-term goals (one
year) and long-term goals (three to five years).

v.

Recommend policies, practices, and procedures which
will achieve both short-term and long-term goals to
the governing board.
A secondary goal for the Special Education Advisory

Council is to communicate the role of the advisory council
to the special education clients of the district.

This

communication should serve as the impetus for providing a
community-wide knowledge base of the special education
services available, the identification and early
intervention processes available, and finally, a supportive
resource/advocacy group for all handicapped children in the
district.
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Outline of Special Education Advisory
Council Orientation for Preschool
Parents, All Existing District
Parents and Employees, and
the Community at Large
I.

II.

Handicapped Education before 1975
A.

Institutionalization

B.

Exclusionary Doctrine

C.

Special classes

D.

Categorical services

E.

Normalization or least restrictive environment

F.

Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1966

G.

Brown v. Board of Education (1954)

H.

PARC (1971)

I.

Mills (1972)

J.

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, sec. 504

The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of
1975; EAHCA; P.L. 94-142
A.

Code of Federal Regulations, Title 34, parts 300
and 104.

B.

Purpose: (20

c.

Definitions in EAHCA

u.s.c.
u.s.c.

1400 et seq.)

1.

FAPE (20

2.

Handicapped children (20
( 1)

3.

Learning disabilities (20
(a) (15)

4.

Special education (20

sec. 1401 (a)

(18))

u.s.c.
u.s.c.

sec. 1401 (a)
sec. 1401

u.s.c.

sec 1401 (a)

u.s.c.

sec. 1401 ( 0)

(16)
5.

Related
(17)

services (20
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III.

IV.

D.

The Handicapped Children's Protection Act of
1986; P.L. 99-392; :Attorney's Fee Bill," (20
U.S. C. sec. 1415 (e) ( 4) and (f)

E.

The Individuals with Disabilities Act of 1990
(IDEA)

California Handicapped Education History
A.

Special schools and classes

B.

Increased categories of service

C.

Day classes

D.

Residential schools

E.

Mandatory programs

F.

California Education Code, part 30 (1980)

Case Law
A.

Federal
1.

U.S. District Courts (F.Supp.)

2.

U.S. Courts of Appeal (F.2d)

3.
B.

c.

a.

Eleven Circuits

b.

D.C. Circuit

c.

Federal Circuit

(Trial)

(Appeals)

U.S. Supreme Court

State
1.

Superior Court (Trial)

2.

California Courts of Appeal (Districts)
(Appeal)

3.

California State Supreme Court

State Agency Administrative Hearings
1.

Education of Handicapped Law Review
(E.H.L.R.)
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V.

Clovis Unified School District as Special Education
Local Plan Area (SELPA)
A.

Policies
1.

CUSD Policy 2109, sec. 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act (1973)

2.

CUSD Policy 3306, Least Restrictive
Environment

3.

CUSD Policy 3307, Independent Education
Evaluations

4.

CUSD Policy 3308, Exceptional Children
a.

B.

C.

CUSD Administrative Regulation 3308

Practices
1.

Referrals: parental consent

2.

Assessment by trained specialists

3.

Development of Individualized Education
Program (IEP)

4.

Certification/decertification of learning
disability

5.

Home school placement

6.

Mainstreaming

7.

Resource Specialist Program

8.

Special Day Class Program

Procedures for Dispute Resolution
1.

Rights

2.

Due Process
a.

Premediation conferences

b.

Mediation conference

c.

Fair hearings

d.

Trial Courts
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3.

VI.

e.

Courts of Appeal

f.

Supreme Courts

Requests for Fair Hearings
a.

Institute for Administrative Justice,
McGeorge School of Law

b.

Advocacy Assistance, Protection and
Advocacy, Inc.

Proactive Preparation for Future Issues
A.

Discipline of handicapped students

B.

Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD)

C.

Total Inclusion: Teacher training

D.

Section 504 disabilities
Learning Activities for/by the Special
Education Advisory Board

The Special Education Advisory Council would have to
conduct a series of seminars regarding the current status of
special education in the district, state, and nation.
At the first seminar, one goal would be to explain
the desired changing of current perceived roles of school
personnel used now in the implementation of special
education and related services.

There is an excellent

seventy-five-minute film entitled The Face of Inclusion: A
Parent's Perspective.

The film is available from LRP

Publications in Pennsylvania.
The film provides a unique and moving parent's
perspective of inclusion for administrators, teachers, and
parents of children with disabilities.

Joe and Ro Vargo are
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the parents of three daughters, the oldest of whom has Rett
Syndrome.
The Vargos are experienced advocates for inclusive
education and have been involved in systemic educational
reform for years.

They share their family philosophy, their

early decision to enroll their daughter in an inclusive
program, the risks and benefits, and the support systems
necessary to be successful.

Their stories of inclusion have

forever changed their lives for the better.
A second seminar should be focused on the evolving
status of special education in the nation, state, and Clovis
Unified School District.

The history of PL 94-142 and its

implementation in California should be presented and
concluded with a description of the current status of
special education and related services in the Clovis Unified
School District.

This is especially important because the

district SELPA has just reorganized its special education
services delivery model.

Essentially, the model was

presented as a voluntary reclassification of approximately
five hundred Special Day Class (SDC) students to the more
inclusive Resource Specialist Program (RSP).

The rationale

for this delivery system modification was that more state
financial revenue would be generated and more RSP teachers
would become available for special education student
consultation.

Additionally, the new consultative RSP

personnel would be able to provide more training and support
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to the regular education teaching staff, who would be
instructing many more RSP students in their new and much
more inclusive regular education classes.
A third foundational seminar would be an in-depth
look at national, state, and district special education
revenues and expenditures.

With an understanding of the

financial status of the SELPA in combination with a
knowledge of the law and its incumbent due processes, the
Special Education Advisory Council could be used for input
on new or revised board policies, practices, and procedures
that could be formulated to provide more collaborative,
collegial administrative, faculty, and parent input in
achieving a positive advocacy for achieving equal access to
a free and appropriate education for handicapped children.
A final foundational seminar would provide a review
of current literature on implementing an inclusive method of
special education for handicapped children.

A SELPA library

of texts and videos should be created for the use of the new
partners in the Goal Sharing.

The following listing would

be the essential start-up bibliography for such an advocacy
council library.

103
Periodicals
Inclusive Education Programs
A monthly newsletter dedicated to the legal and
practical issues in educating children with disabilities
in regular education environments. $135.00
California Special Education Alert
A monthly newsletter dedicated to providing the latest
legal decisions and methodologies for successful special
education programs in California. $235.00
Videos
The Face of Inclusion: A
Parent's Perspective
Illustrates the Joe and Ro Vargo parental experience
with inclusionary education for their daughter who has
Rett Syndrome. 75 mins. $109.00
ADHD: Inclusive Instruction
and Collaborative Practices
Teaches what Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder is
and provides a review of successful and proven team and
classroom approaches. 38 mins. $104.00
The Seven Deadly Sins: Common Mistakes
that Lead to Due Process Hearings
Melinda Maloney, special education attorney, reveals
seven common mistakes that lead to due process hearings.
Case studies are reviewed, and legally based advice is
given to handle such cases. 20 mins. $79.00
How to Discipline Students with Disabilities
Effectively and Legally
Special education students may be disciplined: suspended
and expelled if the conduct is not caused by a
disability. This video illustrates how to comply with
the procedures to protect civil rights and how to
provide alternative educational placements. 20 mins.
$79.00
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Inclusion: Heaven or Hell?
Reviews of inclusion, mainstreaming, least restrictive
environment, and the regular education initiative should
provide guidance for districts to advocate compliance.
20 mins. $79.00
Special Education for Regular Teachers
An in-house training for principals, superintendents,

board members, and other regular education
professionals. Video provides tips for compliance
without breaking budget. 20 mins. $79.00
Public Law 94-142: An Overview

26 mins.

$170.00

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act

28 mins.

$170.00

Discipline

17 mins.

$170.00

Extended School Year Services

17 mins.

$170.00

Least Restrictive Environment

20 mins.

$170.00

Procedural Due Process

20 mins.

$170.00

Attorney's Fees

20 mins.

$170.00

Residential Placement

15 mins.

$170.00

Serving Medically Fragile Students

20 mins.

$170.00

New IDEA Amendments

20 mins.

$170.00

Books
Least Restrictive Environment: Paradox of Inclusion, by
Lawrence M. Siegel, Esq. $32.00
Discipline in the Schools, by Eric Hartwig, PhD, and Gary
Rusch,Esq.
$31.00
Section 504, the ADA, and the Schools, by Perry A. Zirkel,
PhD, and Jeanne M. Kincaid, Esq. $82.00
The Continuing Evolution of Special Education Law, 19781995, by Melinda Maloney, Esq., and Brian Shenker.
$28.50
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Establishing such an essential library would cost
nearly $3,000; however, such a financial outlay would be an
excellent first step in answering the call stated at the
beginning of this chapter to reaffirm the original
philosophical foundations of Public Law 94-142 to
reestablish the trust of educational clients: parents and
students, classroom teachers, and special education
administrators.
Shared knowledge by both school officials and
clients applied pursuant to a collegial advocacy
partnership, i.e., Goal Sharing, has had and can continue to
have a major role in accomplishing equal access to education
for all students, especially those who have disabilities.
In reality, such concepts must be successful or further
growth of the adversarial relationship will continue to
grow, and the competition for the already scarce financial
resources will continue to stay on its less productive
cycle.
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